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BEYOND A REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT:  
JUDGING HABEAS CORPUS 
Noam Biale* 
This Article addresses ongoing confusion in federal habeas corpus 
doctrine about one of the most elemental concepts in law: 
reasonableness.  The Supreme Court recently announced a new 
standard of reasonableness review for habeas cases, intended to raise 
the bar state prisoners must overcome to obtain federal relief.  This new 
standard demands that errors in state court decisions be so profound 
that “no fairminded jurist could disagree” that the result is incorrect.  
Scholars have decried the rigid and exacting nature of this standard, but 
very little interpretive work has yet been done to theorize what it means 
and how it should work.  This Article develops a theoretical framework 
for understanding the new habeas standard and shows that the 
assumptions lower courts are making about its meaning are wrong.  It 
concludes that federal courts need more data beyond the mere 
possibility of fairminded disagreement to find that a decision is 
reasonable.  The Article draws on scholarship and jurisprudence in 
other areas of law that employ reasonableness standards, and argues 
that the missing data should be supplied by examining the state 
adjudicative process.  The case for focusing on state process in federal 
habeas cases is not new, but this Article represents the first argument 
that the new habeas standard not only permits such a focus but, in fact, 
requires it.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
Here is a story that has become almost commonplace in the news 
media:  A horrific crime occurs: let’s say a murder.  Police arrest a 
suspect and the evidence against him seems overwhelming.  Perhaps he 
has confessed, or an eye-witness identifies him, or his co-defendants 
implicate him as the trigger-man.  The suspect is tried in state court and 
convicted.  He is sent to prison; perhaps he is sentenced to death.  The 
case is closed.  Years later, cracks begin to appear in what previously 
 
*   Law Clerk to the Hon. Gerard E. Lynch, United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit.  The author was formerly a Fellow at the Equal Justice Initiative in Montgomery, Alabama, 
litigating state and federal postconviction appeals in death penalty and juvenile life-without-parole 
cases.  Deep gratitude is owed to Anthony G. Amsterdam, Margaret Graham, J. Benton Heath, Randy 
Hertz, Zachary Katznelson, Sarah Knuckey, Shalev Roisman, Erin Adele Scharff, Jennifer Rae Taylor, 
and the members of the Lawyering Scholarship Colloquium at N.Y.U. School of Law for helpful 
comments, probing questions, and abiding encouragement.  
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looked like a solid conviction.  Witnesses recant their statements; the co-
defendants are revealed as perjurers; the defendant’s lawyer failed to 
conduct an adequate investigation of the crime; or the prosecution 
withheld exculpatory evidence.1  The defendant presents this new 
evidence to the state courts, but they refuse to reopen the case.  He files 
a last-ditch, hail-Mary petition to the federal court, seeking a writ of 
habeas corpus.  The federal court faults the state for ignoring the 
defendant’s legal claim.  It reviews the evidence anew and finds that a 
grave injustice occurred.  The federal court grants the defendant’s 
habeas petition and vacates the conviction or sentence.  Though many 
years have passed, a wrong is righted.2 
Here is a story that is seldom told but, in fact, is much more 
commonplace: Another crime; and a different suspect is convicted.  She 
challenges her conviction and sentence on the same grounds as the 
defendant above.  The state courts deny relief.  The defendant files a 
petition for habeas corpus in federal court.  The federal court reviews 
the state court decision and finds compelling reasons to doubt the 
reliability of the defendant’s conviction.  However, the federal court 
says that the result in the state court is at least debatable, and fairminded 
judges could disagree about whether it is correct.  The federal court 
presumes that the state judges who denied relief were all fairminded.  
Therefore, the federal court rules that their decision is not unreasonable, 
and denies the defendant’s habeas petition.  She remains in prison or, 
perhaps, is executed.3  
The difference between these two stories is the Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Supreme Court’s 
 
 1. In the sentencing context, correspondingly, discovery of the defendant’s intellectual 
disability might render him ineligible for the death penalty. 
 2. See, e.g., Death Row Stories: Joe D’Ambrosio (CNN television broadcast Mar. 23, 2014); 
Mosi Secret, His Conviction Overturned, Man is Let Out of Prison After 23 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/nyregion/his-conviction-overturned-man-is-let-out-of-
prison-after-23-years.html?_r=0; Paul House, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment/paul-house (last visited May 30, 2015); see 
generally THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx (last visited May 30, 2015). 
 3. See, e.g., Hawthorne v. Schneiderman, 695 F.3d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 2012) (Calabresi, J., 
concurring) (“This is one of the rare cases in which a habeas petition may well be innocent. . . .  The 
question of Hawthorne’s innocence, however, is not the one we are encouraged—or, at times, even 
allowed—to ask in habeas cases such as this.”); Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1360 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(en banc) (declining to decide whether state burden of proof for intellectual disability violates 
intellectually disabled petitioner’s Eighth Amendment rights where petitioner “failed to show that no 
fairminded jurist could agree with the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision about the burden of proof, and 
thus this Court is without authority to overturn the reasoned judgment of the State’s highest court.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Montgomery v. Bobby, 654 F.3d 668, 676–83 (6th Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (state court did not unreasonably apply Brady v. Maryland where prosecution withheld witness 
statement from defense that asserted that witness had seen victim alive four days after prosecution 
alleged defendant killed her). 
2
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol83/iss4/7
2015] BEYOND A REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT 1339 
interpretation of it.  AEDPA restricts state prisoners’ ability to obtain a 
writ of habeas corpus in federal court by limiting relief to only those 
cases that were “contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” or 
that involved “an unreasonable determination of the facts” by the state 
court.4  Over the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
AEDPA to make “the Great Writ” harder and harder to obtain, despite 
the fact that habeas petitions remain the primary vehicle for establishing 
claims of actual innocence, prosecutorial misconduct, and other issues 
with serious implications for justice.5  The Court has repeatedly 
admonished that only objectively unreasonable state court decisions will 
permit federal habeas relief.  Some lower courts, however, have resisted 
the high deference that the Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to 
demand.  Fed up with a repeat offender, the Ninth Circuit, the Court 
recently raised the burden on establishing an “unreasonable application” 
under AEDPA, requiring a legal error so extreme that “there is no 
possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s 
decision conflicts with th[e] Court’s precedents.”6   
This shift in the standard of review appears to raise the bar 
considerably for habeas petitioners.  Scholars have decried the new 
standard as making habeas relief “virtually unattainable.”7  Little 
interpretive work has yet been done, however, to theorize what the 
standard could mean and how it should operate.  Such theorizing is 
necessary and urgent because of troubling interpretations of the standard 
occurring in lower courts.   
First, some circuit judges have read the Supreme Court’s new gloss 
on the statute, announced in the 2011 case, Harrington v. Richter,8 as 
shifting the federal court’s focus from the reasonableness of the state 
 
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2014). 
 5. Andrea Keilen & Maurie Levin, Moving Forward: A Map for Meaningful Habeas Reform in 
Texas Capital Cases, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 214 (2007) (“Most exonerations have come during habeas 
corpus proceedings, when lawyers have uncovered evidence of  innocence, prosecutorial misconduct, 
ineffective representation, mistaken identifications, perjured testimony by state witnesses, or unreliable 
scientific evidence.”). 
 6. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). 
 7. Judith L. Ritter, The Voice of Reason—Why Recent Judicial Interpretations of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Are Wrong, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 55, 56 (2013) 
[hereinafter Ritter, Voice of Reason]; accord Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and 
the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and 
Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. 
REV. 1219, 1220 (2015) (“[A]ny participant in our habeas regime would have to agree that it resembles 
a twisted labyrinth of deliberately crafted legal obstacles that make it as difficult for habeas petitioners 
to succeed in pursuing the Writ as it would be for a Supreme Court Justice to strike out Babe Ruth, Joe 
DiMaggio, and Mickey Mantle in succession—even with the Chief Justice calling balls and strikes.”) 
[hereinafter Reinhardt, Demise of Habeas]. 
 8. 562 U.S. at 86. 
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decision to the reasonableness of the decision-maker.  This subjective 
test requires federal acquiescence when a presumably fairminded state 
judge has already decided that the petitioner’s claims have no merit.  
That is problematic, to say the least, because no habeas case will reach 
the federal courts unless a state court has already ruled against the 
petitioner.   
A second reading of the standard treats it as an objective test that may 
be conceptualized as follows: in cases where general legal standards are 
applied to specific factual scenarios and several possible results may be 
correct, the existence of a range of possible results is sufficient to render 
the state court decision reasonable.  This standard has some intuitive 
congruence with objective reasonableness, since a result that is arguably 
correct might be said to be ipso facto reasonable.  Under this reading of 
the standard, federal courts need not look at what the state court actually 
did, so long as the ultimate result it reached is at least debatable. 
Both of these interpretations are wrong.   
An examination of the doctrinal roots of the “fairminded 
disagreement” test shows why the subjective reading of the standard is 
misguided.  Richter9 was the first case in over a decade in which the 
Court devoted significant attention to interpreting AEDPA’s 
“unreasonable application” clause.  It did so with reference to 
disagreement among fairminded jurists, a previously-used, though 
dormant, articulation of the statutory standard.  This interpretation 
was already known to habeas law and had a dubious pedigree.  
Following the statute’s enactment, the circuit courts split on whether 
AEDPA required a focus on the reasonableness of state court decisions, 
or of decision-makers, with some ruling that a mere disagreement 
among “fairminded jurists” precluded habeas relief.  The Supreme Court 
rejected that interpretation of the statute in Williams v. Taylor,10 a 2000 
case holding that the state court decision should be assessed based on its 
“objective reasonableness,” not whether “all fairminded jurists” would 
agree with its result.  The Court’s aim was to prevent subjectivism from 
creeping into the standard.  In Richter, the Court gave no indication that 
it was overruling that part of Williams and instead relied on its prior 
precedent.11  The subjectivism now creeping into the habeas opinions of 
numerous circuit judges applying Richter cannot be squared with a 
proper understanding of the Supreme Court’s habeas jurisprudence.  Yet 
numerous eminent jurists in the Courts of Appeals have, at least 
 
 9. I adhere to the convention of referring to habeas cases by the name of the habeas petitioner 
even when that party is the respondent in the Supreme Court (as often happens when the case arises 
from the Ninth Circuit). 
 10. 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000). 
 11. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101. 
4
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol83/iss4/7
2015] BEYOND A REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT 1341 
rhetorically, endorsed this subjective version of the standard.  As its first 
order of business, this Article will put these subjective arguments to rest. 
The second reading of the habeas standard, focusing on whether the 
state court’s ultimate result is debatable, though more compelling, is 
also problematic.  Identifying that a range of possible results may exist 
does not offer any guidance for determining which of those results is 
reasonable.  This Article argues that this approach to reasonableness 
should be jettisoned in the habeas context for several reasons: First, 
treating fairminded disagreement about the merits of a claim as a 
sufficient condition for finding the adjudication of that claim reasonable 
is, in fact, equivalent to a demand for universal consensus—the 
requirement rejected in Williams.  Second, the notion that fairminded 
disagreement is sufficient to preclude federal habeas relief conflicts 
with the purposes of habeas and the structure of AEDPA.  Third, this 
interpretation of the standard scrambles the elements identified by the 
statute, introducing conceptual confusion to the doctrine.  Finally, the 
Supreme Court’s attempts to limit this standard to legal rules of 
“general” application provides hardly any limitation at all given the 
types of claims usually raised in habeas.  Therefore, contrary to what 
Richter suggests, fairminded disagreement, without more, is an 
inadequate standard for determining what is reasonable in habeas law.   
What more, then, is needed?  What additional data do courts need to 
determine whether a state decision is reasonable?  To answer those 
questions, this Article will bring to bear existing scholarship and 
jurisprudence from other areas of law that employ objective 
reasonableness standards.  Constitutional tort law, such as civil rights 
suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is especially informative for 
habeas jurisprudence because its use of an objective reasonableness 
standard mirrors AEDPA’s.12  Of course, § 1983 and habeas law serve 
different purposes, and § 1983 jurisprudence is itself far from ideal.  But 
it provides a useful illustration of this Article’s thesis: federal courts 
need more data than simply the result of a state court decision 
(sometimes unaccompanied by an opinion) to determine whether that 
decision was reasonable.  The Supreme Court’s § 1983 cases provide 
examples of the additional data that the Court considers in addition to 
“fairminded disagreement.”  Namely, the Court looks to the process that 
government decision-makers go through, including the “step[s] that 
 
 12. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).  Other scholars have noted that this area of 
law is “perceived as contiguous to habeas, and hence [is] ripe for doctrinal transplantation.”  Aziz Huq, 
Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 590 (2014) [hereinafter Huq, Habeas & 
Roberts]; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for Rights-First 
Constitutional Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595 (2009). 
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could reasonably be expected of them”13 and the “division of 
functions”14 between them and other institutional actors, in order to 
determine whether these decision-makers acted reasonably or not.  
Although the Court has not been explicit about what it is doing in the 
constitutional tort context, an examination of its cases reveals these 
principles at work. 
These principles provide a framework for thinking about what 
additional data the federal habeas court reviewing a state decision 
should examine beyond whether the ultimate result is debatable.  Similar 
to constitutional tort defendants, state courts similarly go through a 
process in adjudicating a habeas petitioner’s federal claims, which 
variously may involve appointing an attorney to represent the petitioner 
in postconviction proceedings; holding an evidentiary hearing; and 
issuing a reasoned opinion explaining why relief is denied.  They also 
have their own “division of functions” between trial and appellate 
courts.  Depending on what the state court does, its decision may be 
more or less reliable and protective of the petitioner’s federal 
constitutional rights.  In order to determine whether the state court 
adjudication led to a decision that involves a reasonable application of 
federal law, therefore, the federal court should look broadly to the state 
adjudicative process. 
The prescription that federal courts consider state procedures in their 
determination whether to grant or deny federal habeas relief is not new.  
It has been discussed and supported by scholars with profoundly 
divergent views on the desirability of federal review of state criminal 
proceedings.15  But this Article is the first to argue that a correct reading 
of the new AEDPA standard of review actually requires that the federal 
court pay attention to state procedures.  It may be unrealistic to 
anticipate that the Supreme Court will adopt such an approach with its 
 
 13. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1249 (2012) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 14. Malley, 475 U.S. at 352–53 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 15. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 456 (1963) (“When should state determinations, subject to direct 
Supreme Court review, not be final?  I suggest that one answer, at least, fits into the very category we 
have been discussing: cases where the state has, in effect, failed itself to provide process.  It is, after all, 
the essence of the responsibility of the states under the due process clause to furnish a criminal 
defendant with a full and fair opportunity to make his defense and litigate his case: the state must 
provide a reasoned method of inquiry into relevant questions of fact and law . . . .”) [hereinafter Bator, 
Finality]; see also Justin F. Marceau, Don’t Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet) Taken in § 2254 
Habeas Corpus Adjudications, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 54–56 (2010) (arguing that focus on process in state 
court is “common denominator” between pre-AEDPA critiques of habeas review like Bator’s and 
modern commentary critiquing AEDPA’s limitations on habeas review) [hereinafter Marceau, Due 
Process]; Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1, 26–33 (2010) 
(discussing use of habeas law to make systematic, structural reform to state criminal processes) 
[hereinafter Primus, Structural Habeas]. 
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current ethos of federalism trumping fairness in individual criminal 
cases.  But the hope is that this Article will provide the groundwork for 
a rethinking of habeas for state prisoners, while providing practitioners 
with some arguments to use in the meantime when faced with the 
fairminded disagreement standard. 
This Article therefore has two projects: one descriptive and one 
prescriptive.  The descriptive project looks at the evolution of habeas 
jurisprudence to evaluate the two primary readings of Richter and finds 
them both lacking in doctrinal consistency and logical coherence.  The 
prescriptive portion looks to other areas of law for guidance on what 
other factors federal courts should consider in deciding whether a state 
court decision is reasonable under AEDPA, and suggests several ways 
that guidance ought to bear on habeas adjudication.  This Article argues 
that the state court process is not only a desirable matter for federal 
court consideration, but also a necessary one.  That does not mean, 
however, that the fairminded disagreement standard stated in Richter is 
wrong and can be rejected by habeas petitioners and the lawyers who 
represent them.  As the standard becomes a fixture in habeas 
jurisprudence, petitioners and practitioners ignore it at their peril.  
Accordingly, this Article provides a theoretical assessment of the 
standard, and argues that there is more leeway inherent in it than 
scholars and the courts have so far recognized.  This is not an 
endorsement, but rather an attempt to reckon with a troublesome reality 
of habeas practice.   
The Article continues in four parts:  Part II will introduce Richter and 
then provide background to establish what is at stake and how the 
Supreme Court arrived at the fairminded disagreement standard.  Part III 
will describe the problems that Richter has wrought: the subjective 
interpretation of the standard that is appearing in circuit court opinions 
and the more plausible, but still flawed, objective interpretation of the 
standard.  This Part will conclude that federal courts need more than the 
mere existence or possibility of fairminded disagreement about a case’s 
result to determine whether the state court’s adjudication was 
reasonable.  Part IV will therefore ask what “more” is needed, and will 
argue that federal courts should take additional data from the state 
adjudicative process.  A focus on process is appropriate because: (1) it is 
a background assumption of habeas law in our federal system, (2) it is 
consistent with, and in fact, contemplated by AEDPA, and (3) it is how 
other areas of law assess reasonableness.  This Part will draw lessons 
from existing scholarship and jurisprudence in some of these other areas 
of law, focusing especially on the use of an objective reasonableness 
standard in constitutional tort law.  A careful reading of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence in that area reveals a process-based framework for 
7
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assessing reasonableness at work.  Part V will then apply that 
framework to habeas law and suggest some state court procedures and 
structures that federal courts should consider in determining whether the 
adjudication of a habeas petitioner’s claim is objectively reasonable.   
Before plunging into the discussion, a word about terminology: the 
cases I will be discussing make reference to agreement among “all 
reasonable jurists,” matters about which “fairminded jurists could 
disagree,” issues “beyond fairminded disagreement,” and so forth.  I 
treat these as different expressions of the same standard, though I 
recognize that fairmindedness and reasonableness do not necessarily 
have the same natural meaning.     
II. RICHTER IN CONTEXT: THE RISE AND FALL AND RISE OF THE 
FAIRMINDED JURISTS 
A. The “Great Writ” and AEDPA: A Brief Background 
The “Great Writ” of habeas corpus predates the founding of the 
United States and harks back to the principle articulated in the Magna 
Carta that “No free man shall be taken or imprisoned . . . except by the 
legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”16  The writ 
developed in English common law as “a mechanism for securing 
compliance with the King’s laws.”17  The Framers incorporated the writ 
into the Constitution by supplying limited circumstances for its 
suspension (only Congress may do it, and only “when in Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it”).18  In our federal 
system, habeas has acted as a check on both state and federal sovereign 
power, and since 1867 has permitted prisoners to petition a federal court 
for relief if either sovereign imprisons them in violation of the 
Constitution and laws of the United States.19  To its proponents, 
therefore, robust federal habeas review of state criminal convictions and 
sentences represents “‘a double security’” against government 
overreach, an example of “the federal system . . . working as it 
should.”20 
 
 16. Art. 39, in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 17 (R. Perry & J. Cooper eds. 1959). 
 17. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 740 (2008) (citing Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, 
The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 
575, 585 (2008)). 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
 19. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012); Act of February 5, 1867 (“Habeas Corpus Act of 1867”), § 1, ch 
28, 39th Cong., 14 Stat 385, 385–86 (1867). 
 20. Eric M. Freedman, State Post-Conviction Remedies in the Next Fifteen Years: How Synergy 
Between the State and Federal Governments Can Improve the Criminal Justice System Nationally, 24 
FED. SENT’G REP. 298, 299 (2012) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 295 (James Madison) (1788)) 
8
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All that past is prologue to a seismic change in habeas corpus law that 
occurred late in the 20th Century.  Prior to the enactment of the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),21 a 
prisoner in state custody could petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 
federal court and receive de novo review of his federal claims.22  That 
standard of review drew vigorous critiques from some of the most 
distinguished scholars and jurists in the country, including Professors 
Paul Bator and Paul Mishkin, Judge Henry Friendly, and Justice John 
Marshall Harlan II, who argued that the criminal justice system’s 
interest in finality should trump the prisoner’s interest in endlessly 
relitigating claims already passed on by the state court.23  These calls for 
a greater emphasis on finality gained widespread scholarly and judicial 
acceptance, and achieved ultimate success with the passage of 
AEDPA.24   
Although the impetus for AEDPA was a perception in Congress that 
the federal death penalty proceeded at too glacial a pace, the statute as 
enacted had the greatest significance for state prisoners appealing both 
capital and non-capital convictions.25  The statute created procedural 
 
[hereinafter Freedman, Post-Conviction Remedies]. 
 21. S. 735, 104th Cong., 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 
15, 18, 22, 28, 49 U.S.C.). 
 22. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953). 
 23. See Bator, Finality, supra note 15, at 453 (“Somehow, somewhere, we must accept the fact 
that human institutions are short of infallible; there is reason for a policy which leaves well enough 
alone and which channels our limited resources of concern toward more productive ends.”); Paul J. 
Mishkin, Foreword: the High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. 
L. REV. 56, 79–80 (1965) (“Even the broadest view of the writ’s functions would not deny that a proper 
sentence of a competent court imposed after an unquestionably fair trial is an acceptable justification for 
continued imprisonment; the mere possibility, however real, that a new trial might produce a different 
result is not a sufficient basis for habeas corpus.”); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? 
Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 155 (1970) (“I perceive no general 
principle mandating a second round of attacks simply because the alleged error is a ‘constitutional’ 
one.”); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by 
a judgment providing that a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter 
his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation.”). 
 24. See Justin F. Marceau, Is Guilt Dispositive? Federal Habeas After Martinez, 55 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2071, 2086 (2014) (“History has been kind to Friendly’s proposals.”); accord Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309–10 (1989) (finding criticisms of Bator and Mishkin to be persuasive, and 
adopting Justice Harlan’s view of retroactivity for cases on collateral review); see also Alan K. Chen, 
Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 535, 548–49 (1999) (discussing Supreme Court’s pre-AEDPA restrictions on habeas 
relief). 
 25. The legislative history of AEDPA has been covered thoroughly in other articles.  See, e.g., 
Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443 (2007) 
[hereinafter Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks]; Allan Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(D)(1): A Commentary on Statutory Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 677 (2003) [hereinafter Ides, Standards]; Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: 
Successive Problems in Capital Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 701 (2002) (noting 
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obstacles to federal habeas review, requiring exhaustion of all federal 
claims in the state court,26 a strict one-year time limit on filing a federal 
petition after the conviction becomes final,27 harsh limitations on filing 
successive petitions,28 and onerous requirements for obtaining a 
certificate of appealability in order to appeal an adverse decision from a 
federal district court.29   
In addition to these procedural hurdles, AEDPA amended the 
substantive standard of review for the merits of state court decisions, 
eliminating de novo review.  Section 2254(d) of the statute barred the 
federal court from granting the writ unless the petitioner could 
demonstrate that the state courts’ adjudication of the merits of his claim 
either 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 
State court proceeding.30 
The combination of these procedural and substantive barriers to 
habeas relief was met with what Justin Marceau has described as “a vast 
expression of fear and loathing.”31  Numerous commentators argued that 
various of AEDPA’s provisions were unconstitutional.32  The Supreme 
Court disagreed explicitly about the Act’s provisions regarding 
successive petitions33 and has applied the substantive provisions without 
 
AEDPA was passed “in an atmosphere of anger and fear” in reaction to Oklahoma City Bombing). 
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (2012). 
 27. Id. § 2244(d)(1) (2012). 
 28. Id. § 2244(b)(1). 
 29. Id. § 2253(c)(3) (2012). 
 30. Id. § 2254(d). 
 31. Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69 WASH. & 
LEE. L. REV. 85, 94 (2012) (citing Professor James Liebman’s remark, “Dwarfed among the many 
unspeakable evils that [Timothy] McVeigh wrought is a speakable one . . . , namely, the so-called 
[AEDPA]” (alterations in original)) [hereinafter Marceau, Challenging Habeas Process].  Professor 
Marceau describes the “fear among scholars and practitioners that AEDPA was effecting a sub rosa, 
procedural evisceration of the critical constitutional protections of the Bill of Rights incorporated 
against the state by the Warren Court.”  Id. at 94–95. 
 32. See James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and 
Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 873–76 (1998) 
(arguing that an interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) that would require federal courts to defer to state court 
determinations of mixed questions of law and fact would “raise[] at least a serious doubt about the 
provision's constitutionality”); see also Kimberly Woolley, Note, Constitutional Interpretations of the 
Antiterrorism Act’s Habeas Corpus Provisions, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 437 (1998). 
 33. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) (holding that added restrictions which AEDPA 
places on successive habeas petitions do not amount to a “suspension” of the writ contrary to Article I, 
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expressing any doubt as to their constitutionality.34  Nonetheless, 
criticism of the statute has remained constant,35 especially in the capital 
context, where both judges and commentators have argued that 
potentially meritorious claims are either barred from review by the 
onerous procedural provisions or subject to such an obsequious level of 
deference under the substantive standard of review that the Act 
perpetuates major miscarriages of justice, including the execution of the 
innocent.36  For example, in his 2014 Madison Lecture, Judge William 
A. Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit described in detail the case of Kevin 
Cooper, a man on California’s death row who, in Judge Fletcher’s view, 
was likely framed by the San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department.37  After 
recounting the wrongdoing of the State in the case, which included 
tampering with witnesses, destroying evidence that implicated suspects 
other than Cooper, withholding exculpatory evidence from the defense, 
and bungling the DNA testing that could have cleared Cooper’s name, 
 
§ 9). 
 34. See Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1129 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We consider the Court’s 
longstanding application of the rules set forth in AEDPA to be strong evidence of the Act’s 
constitutionality.”). 
 35. Besides the justice implications discussed infra, scholars have called the current system of 
adjudicating habeas petitions under AEDPA “‘chaos,’ an ‘intellectual disaster area,’ ‘a charade,’ and ‘so 
unworkable and perverse that reformers should feel no hesitation about scrapping large chunks of it.’”  
Primus, Structural Habeas, supra note 15, at 1 (quoting Larry W. Yackle, State Convicts and Federal 
Courts: Reopening the Habeas Corpus Debate, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 541, 542, 553 (2006); Joseph L. 
Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
791, 816 (2009); Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and Proposed 
Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 42 (2002)).  Criticism of the 
statute has even broken through to the mainstream (if highbrow) media.  See Lincoln Caplan, The 
Destruction of Defendants’ Rights, THE NEW YORKER, June 21, 2015, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-destruction-of-defendants-rights (“[AEDPA] is surely 
one of the worst statutes ever passed by Congress and signed into law by a President.”).   
 36. See Hawthorne v. Schneiderman, 695 F.3d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 2012) (Calabresi, J., 
concurring) (“This is one of the rare cases in which a habeas petitioner may well be innocent. . . .  The 
question of Hawthorne’s innocence, however, is not the one we are encouraged—or, at times, even 
allowed—to ask in habeas cases such as this . . . .  [T]he Supreme Court and Congress have shaped 
habeas review so that technical errors—typically by prisoners and their counsel—often preclude genuine 
inquiry into guilt and innocence.”); accord Stephen R. Reinhardt, Life to Death: Our Constitution and 
How It Grows, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 391, 408–09 (2010) (“[Under AEDPA,] even if the conviction or 
sentence is unconstitutional under clearly established Supreme Court law, a state court ruling to the 
contrary will not be overturned and the petitioner will remain incarcerated or may be executed, unless 
the ruling of the state court was not only wrong, but unreasonably so. Can this really be the law?  Is 
AEDPA constitutional?  Does its limitation of access to the writ of habeas corpus by persons 
unconstitutionally sentenced or convicted, including capital defendants, conform with the Framer[]s[’] 
purpose of ‘establishing justice’?  It would hardly appear to do so.”); Dan Poulson, Note, Suspension for 
Beginners: Ex Parte Bollman and the Unconstitutionality of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 399 (2008) (arguing that under proper understanding of 
Suspension Clause, “AEDPA’s qualitative restrictions on federal habeas review for state prisoners are 
plainly unconstitutional”).   
 37. See Cooper v. Brown, 565 F.3d 581, 581–635 (9th Cir. 2009) (Fletcher, J., dissenting from 
denial of petition for rehearing en banc). 
11
Biale: Beyond a Reasonable Disagreement:  Judging Habeas Corpus
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2015
1348 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83 
Judge Fletcher stated, “If you have been wondering why Kevin Cooper 
is still on death row, the answer is AEDPA.”38   
B. Harrington v. Richter 
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court decided Richter in 2011 
after a decade of repeatedly reversing grants of habeas corpus based, in 
the Court’s view, on insufficient deference to the state courts.39  Richter 
reflected the Supreme Court’s frustration with lower courts’ 
(specifically the Ninth Circuit’s) refusal to “respect the limited role”40 of 
the federal court in AEDPA cases.41   
In Richter, a prisoner sentenced to life without parole filed a state 
habeas petition to the California Supreme Court alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel.42  The state court denied the petition in a one-
sentence summary order.43  After the federal district court and a panel of 
the Ninth Circuit denied the federal habeas petition, the en banc Ninth 
Circuit reversed, questioning whether § 2254(d) applied at all to a 
summary denial, but holding that the California Supreme Court’s 
decision was “unreasonable in any event.”44 
Writing for seven justices (Justice Ginsburg concurred in the 
judgment and Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration), Justice 
Kennedy first considered whether § 2254(d) applied when a state court’s 
order was unaccompanied by an opinion stating its reasoning.  Justice 
Kennedy pointed out that the text of the statute did not require a 
statement of reasons; it referred only to a “decision.”45  He added that 
every Court of Appeals to consider the issue had held that a written 
opinion was not necessary to determining whether the state court’s 
 
 38. William A. Fletcher, Our Broken Death Penalty, 89 N.Y.U L. REV. 805, 824 (2014). 
 39. See Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, A Decade of Reversal: The Ninth Circuit’s Record in the 
Supreme Court Through October Term 2010, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2165, 2165–68 (2012) 
(describing Ninth Circuit’s “strikingly poor” record of reversals before Supreme Court and noting that 
its record in cases involving the proper standard of review under AEDPA is “especially troubling”); but 
see Reinhardt, Demise of Habeas, supra note 7, at 1223 (“To be clear, we [the Ninth Circuit] follow 
Supreme Court precedent when we decide habeas cases.  What we do not do is attempt to anticipate the 
extreme rules that the Court often devises to deny habeas relief to deny habeas relief to persons who 
may have been convicted or sentenced unconstitutionally; nor do we adopt those rules before the Court 
tells us that we must do so.”).   
 40. Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 10 (2007). 
 41. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 92 (2011) (citing “judicial disregard for the sound and 
established principles that inform” proper issuance of writ “inherent in the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit”). 
 42. Id. at 96. 
 43. Id.  (citing In re Richter, No. S082167, 2001 Cal. LEXIS 1946 (Mar. 28, 2001)). 
 44. Id.at 97 (citing Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)). 
 45. Id. at 98. 
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decision was unreasonable.46  The Court therefore held, “Where a state 
court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas 
petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no 
reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.”47   
The Supreme Court’s decision on summary denials was the main 
holding of Richter and garnered the most attention.48  But the Court 
went further.  In explaining how the Ninth Circuit erred in its 
adjudication of AEDPA question, the Court cited prior precedent 
establishing that § 2254(d)’s “unreasonable application” standard is 
“different from an incorrect application.”49  Justice Kennedy then 
offered a highly exacting articulation of the standard, saying: “A state 
court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas 
relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of 
the state court’s decision.”50  In case there was any question about the 
burden habeas petitioners faced, Justice Kennedy added, “If this 
standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.  As 
amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar 
on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state 
proceedings.”51  He noted that AEDPA “preserves authority to issue the 
writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could 
disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with this Court's 
precedents[,]” but, he said, “It goes no further.”52  Later, Justice 
Kennedy reiterated, “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a 
federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on 
the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification 
that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing 
law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.53 
The reference to disagreement among fairminded jurists appeared to 
be a reformulation of AEDPA standard by the Supreme Court, though 
as we will see in the next sub-part, that interpretation of the 
unreasonable application clause was not entirely new to habeas 
jurisprudence.  To understand how the unreasonable application clause 
in the statute came to be defined in terms of fairminded disagreement, it 
 
 46. Id. (collecting cases).  But see Matthew Seligman, Note, Harrington’s Wake: Unanswered 
Questions on AEDPA’s Application to Summary Dispositions, 64 STAN. L. REV. 469, 478–83 (2012) 
(noting this issue was contentiously debated in the circuit courts until a majority reached similar 
conclusion) [hereinafter Seligman, Harrington’s Wake]. 
 47. Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. 
 48. See generally Seligman, Harrington’s Wake, supra note 46. 
 49. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101. 
 50. Id.  (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 51. Id. at 102. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 103. 
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is necessary first to consider the reasonableness standard in the law 
generally, and then to examine how it was incorporated into the habeas 
context.    
C. Reasonableness: The “Familiar” Standard 
Standards of reasonableness pervade the law.  Reasonableness is hard 
to define in the abstract, yet it is commonly used in nearly every legal 
arena, from negligence suits in torts, to claims of self-defense in 
criminal prosecutions, to the assessment of searches and seizures under 
the Fourth Amendment, the determination of whether a suspect is in 
custody under the Fifth Amendment, the efficacy of counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment—the list goes on.  Reasonableness can, of course, be 
either subjective or objective, focusing respectively on either the 
particular characteristics of a person and whether she is reasonable (as 
Allan Ides has discussed, this really translates to a question of whether 
the person is “rational”54); or what a fictitious, anonymous everyman 
would do in the same situation.   
The latter, objective test has proved much more useful and has been 
the touchstone of the common law since the early 19th Century.55  The 
objective test is highly flexible: it can be applied to an endless array of 
people in an endless array of situations.56  It is also administrable, 
allowing judges and juries to assess a defendant’s behavior without 
having to peer into her mind.  Finally, it is prospective-looking, 
protecting defendants from having their actions viewed through the 
harsh glare of hindsight.  But, as Richard Epstein has pointed out in the 
torts context, it is a somewhat “‘higher’ or more demanding” standard 
than subjective good faith; “With an objective standard the risk of 
[defendant’s] poor intelligence or discretion falls on [the defendant], 
while the subjective standard places the risk of [defendant’s] failings on 
[the plaintiff.]”57 So the objective standard strikes a balance between 
competing interests in backward-looking litigation.  That balance is 
 
 54. Ides, Standards, supra note 25, at 689. 
 55. The rejection of the subjective standard in favor of the objective standard has been black 
letter law since the 1830’s English decision Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (1837) 
(arguing subjective standard “would be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual”). 
 56. See W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 173–74 
(5th ed. 1984) (“The whole theory of negligence presupposes some uniform standard of behavior. Yet 
the infinite variety of situations which may arise makes it impossible to fix definite rules in advance for 
all conceivable human conduct. The utmost that can be done is to devise something in the nature of a 
formula, the application of which in each particular case must be left to the jury, or to the court. The 
standard of conduct which the community demands must be an external and objective one, rather than 
the individual judgment, good or bad, of the particular actor; and it must be, so far as possible, the same 
for all persons, since the law can have no favorites.”). 
 57. RICHARD EPSTEIN, TORTS § 5.3, at 122 (10th Ed., 2012). 
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apparently a savory one, since we continue to apply the objective 
standard wherever we encounter a thorny legal problem.   
In addition, although the objective standard is grounded in the fiction 
of a single “reasonable person,” who may stand in for anyone, it does 
permit some consideration of personal characteristics as they impact 
what a reasonable person would do in the particular circumstances.  In 
assessing objective reasonableness, “courts . . . may make ‘allowance 
not only for external facts, but sometimes for certain characteristics of 
the actor himself,’ including physical disability, youth, or advanced 
age.”58  In addition to such disabilities, the court may account for 
expertise; for example, in a medical malpractice suit, the defendant’s 
actions are evaluated based on a standard of what a reasonable doctor 
would do when faced with a medical issue,59 not what a reasonable 
person would do (presumably, call a doctor).  Similarly, for determining 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, an attorney’s decisions are 
judged to be reasonable or unreasonable with reference to prevailing 
professional norms of legal practice.60  And, as relevant here, a 
reasonableness standard that evaluates judicial actions would be a 
reasonable jurist test—or, in Professor Ides’s words, a standard of “a 
prudent and careful jurist applying professional standards of craft and 
competence.”61   
D. Objective Reasonableness in Habeas 
 It is no surprise then, given the ubiquity and flexibility of the 
objective reasonableness test, that the Supreme Court would cite the 
“familiar” understanding of the standard to interpret the meaning of 
“unreasonable application” in AEDPA.62  As we will see, in its first 
interpretation of the statute, the Court faced a choice between two 
standards—objective reasonableness and error beyond fairminded 
disagreement—and opted for the former.   
1. Early Interpretations of AEDPA in the Circuits 
Following the passage of AEDPA, interpretation of the meaning of 
“unreasonable application” quickly produced a circuit split.  The 
 
 58. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 674 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting KEETON, 
ET AL., supra note 56, § 32, T 174–179). 
 59. See, e.g., Nestorowich v. Ricotta, 767 N.E.2d 125, 128 (N.Y. 2002) (“A doctor is charged 
with the duty to exercise due care, as measured against the conduct of his or her own peers—the 
reasonably prudent doctor standard.”). 
 60. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
 61. Ides, Standards, supra note 25, at 688–89. 
 62. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409–10 (2010). 
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Fourth,63 Fifth,64 and Eleventh65 Circuits interpreted “unreasonable 
application” to mean a decision that all reasonable jurists would agree is 
incorrect.66  In the Fifth Circuit case, Drinkard v. Johnson,67 one 
member of the panel dissented from the majority’s holding that the state 
court decided the merits of the constitutional claim correctly.  The Fifth 
Circuit majority noted this disagreement as a basis for concluding that 
the state court’s application of the law was not unreasonable.68  As the 
court put it, “[A]n application of law to facts is unreasonable only when 
it can be said that reasonable jurists considering the question would be 
of one view that the state court ruling was incorrect.”69  In other words, 
the mere fact of a split among fairminded judges in the Fifth Circuit 
panel was held to support the decision to deny habeas relief.   
The Third Circuit took a different approach, arguing that the all-
reasonable-jurists definition “unduly discourage[d] the granting of relief 
insofar as it require[d] the federal habeas court to hold that the state 
court judges acted in a way that no reasonable jurist would under the 
circumstances.”70  The problem with that definition, according to the 
Third Circuit, was that it had “a tendency to focus attention on the 
reasonableness of the jurists rather than the merits of the decision 
 
 63. Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 873 (4th Cir. 1998) (“If no reasonable jurist would disagree 
over the applicability of the principle to the new context, then the petitioner will have shown not only 
that the decision was ‘contrary to’ clearly established precedent on an understanding of section 
2254(d)(1) that analyzes extensions of principle to new contexts under the ‘contrary to’ clause of the 
section; he also will have shown that the decision was an ‘unreasonable application of’ clearly 
established law on an understanding of the section that analyzes such extension under the ‘unreasonable 
application of’ clause.  And the writ will issue.”). 
 64. Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e can grant habeas relief only if 
a state court decision is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.”). 
 65. Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917, 924 (11th Cir. 1998) (adopting Fifth Circuit’s standard). 
 66. Although not employing the “all reasonable jurists” language, the Seventh Circuit held that 
AEDPA greatly increased the amount of deference owed to state courts under the “unreasonable 
application” clause.  Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“[AEDPA] tells 
federal courts: Hands off, unless the judgment in place is based on an error grave enough to be called 
‘unreasonable.’”).   
 67. Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 770. 
 68. Id. at 769 (“It follows that when the jurists considering the state court ruling disagree in this 
manner, the application of the law by the state court is not unreasonable.  The AEDPA therefore bars us 
from granting relief to Drinkard on this claim.”). 
 69. Id.; see also Green v. French, 142 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Drinkard, 97 F.3d 
at 751). 
 70. Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 889 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc).  The First 
Circuit, by the way, developed yet a third standard, holding that habeas corpus could be granted only if 
the state court decision was “so offensive to existing precedent, so devoid of record support, or so 
arbitrary, as to indicate that it is outside the universe of plausible, credible outcomes.”  O’Brien v. 
Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 1998).  The Eighth Circuit also twice found an unreasonable 
application before Williams, but did not articulate what rendered the state court decision unreasonable, 
as opposed to just erroneous.  See Atley v. Ault, 191 F.3d 865, 871-73 (8th Cir. 1999); Long v. 
Humphrey, 184 F.3d 758, 761 (8th Cir. 1999).  
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itself.”71  To avoid this problem, the Third Circuit held that the 
appropriate question was whether the state court’s decision was 
“objectively reasonable.”72  The court acknowledged that this standard 
would not dictate an obvious result in every case, but argued, “Notions 
of reasonableness abound in the law and are not ordinarily considered 
problematic, despite their imprecision.”73 
2. The Supreme Court Interprets § 2254(d)(1) in Williams  
The Supreme Court resolved this circuit split in 2000, when it decided 
Williams v. Taylor.
74
  Petitioner Terry Williams asserted that his trial 
counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase of his capital trial for 
failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence.75  The federal 
district court granted Williams’s petition, finding that the state court’s 
rejection of his claim amounted to an unreasonable application of 
Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court case establishing that 
deficient performance of counsel combined with prejudice to the 
defendant constitutes a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.76  The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that it could not say that 
the state court “decided the question by interpreting or applying the 
relevant precedent in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is 
unreasonable.”77   
The Supreme Court produced a fractured opinion reversing the Fourth 
Circuit.  Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court as to the 
merits, holding that Williams’s trial counsel was ineffective.78  
However, Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court as to the 
interpretation of AEDPA’s substantive provision, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1).79  Justice O’Connor’s opinion first attempted to delineate 
the respective meanings of § 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” and 
“unreasonable application” clauses.80  According to Justice O’Connor, 
the “contrary to” clause came into play when either (a) the state court 
 
 71. Matteo, 171 F.3d at 889. 
 72. Id. at 889-90. 
 73. Id. at 891 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (observing, in Fourth 
Amendment context, that “the test of reasonableness . . . is not capable of precise definition or 
mechanical application”)).    
 74. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
 75. Id. at 370. 
 76. See 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 77. Williams, 529 U.S. at 374 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860, 865 (4th Cir. 1998)) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 78. Id. at 390-99 (Op. of Stevens, J.). 
 79. Id. at 402-13 (Op. of O’Connor, J.).   
 80. Id. at 404.  She criticized Justice Stevens for failing to give the two clauses independent 
meaning. 
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arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on 
a question of law, or (b) if the state court confronts facts that are 
materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent 
and arrives at a result opposite to the Court.81  By contrast, Congress’s 
inclusion of the “unreasonable application” language suggested that 
when a state court correctly identifies the governing legal rule and then 
applies it to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case, the task of the 
federal court under AEDPA is to determine whether that application was 
“unreasonable.”82 
Justice O’Connor then turned to the meaning of “unreasonable” under 
the statute.  She noted the Fourth Circuit’s holding that a state court 
decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established 
federal law “only if the state court has applied federal law ‘in a manner 
that reasonable jurists would agree is unreasonable,’”83 but she held, 
“The placement of this additional overlay on the ‘unreasonable 
application’ clause was erroneous.”84  Instead, “a federal habeas court 
making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask whether the 
state court’s application of clearly established law was objectively 
unreasonable.”85  Responding to the “all reasonable jurists” test, Justice 
O’Connor added:   
The federal habeas court should not transform the inquiry into a 
subjective one by resting its determination . . . on the simple fact 
that at least one of the Nation’s jurists has applied the relevant 
federal law in the same manner the state court did in the habeas 
petitioner’s case.  The “all reasonable jurists” standard would tend 
to mislead federal habeas courts by focusing their attention on a 
subjective inquiry rather than an objective one.86 
As an example of a federal habeas court so misled, Justice O’Connor 
 
 81. Id. at 405. 
 82. Id. at 407–08.  In this respect, Justice O’Connor held that the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation 
of the “unreasonable application” clause was correct.  Id. 
 83. Id. at 409 (quoting Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
 84. Id.   
 85. Id. (emphasis added). 
 86. Id. at 409–10.  Justice Stevens agreed with Justice O’Connor that the “all reasonable jurists” 
test was an erroneous interpretation of the unreasonable application clause, and his opinion provided 
further explanation of the problems with such a test.  See id. at 377–78 (Op. of Stevens., J.) (“[T]he 
statute says nothing about ‘reasonable judges,’ presumably because all, or virtually all, such judges 
occasionally commit error; they make decisions that in retrospect may be characterized as 
‘unreasonable.’  Indeed, it is most unlikely that Congress would deliberately impose such a requirement 
of unanimity on federal judges. As Congress is acutely aware, reasonable lawyers and lawgivers 
regularly disagree with one another. Congress surely did not intend that the views of one such judge 
who might think that relief is not warranted in a particular case should always have greater weight than 
the contrary, considered judgment of several other reasonable judges.”). 
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disapprovingly cited the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Drinkard that a state 
court’s application of federal law could not be unreasonable because the 
Court of Appeals panel split 2–1 on the underlying constitutional 
question.87  Justice O’Connor acknowledged that “[t]he term 
‘unreasonable’ is no doubt difficult to define,” but she said, “it is a 
common term in the legal world and, accordingly, federal judges are 
familiar with its meaning.”88  Justice O’Connor then defined what an 
unreasonable application of federal law is not: merely an incorrect 
application of federal law.89   
Williams left the increment of incorrectness beyond error necessary to 
overcome AEDPA’s bar to relief unexplained, however.  This prompted 
head-scratching from judges attempting to apply AEDPA’s substantive 
provisions in light of Williams.  Judge Jon O. Newman of the Second 
Circuit remarked that Justice O’Connor’s formulation of the 
unreasonable application clause was “virtually tautological,” directing 
courts to grant the writ where the state court decision was not merely 
erroneous but also unreasonable.90  He added that “the increment [of 
incorrectness beyond error] need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief 
would be limited to state court decisions so off the mark as to suggest 
judicial incompetence.”91   
Despite the “common,” “familiar” understanding of objective 
reasonableness, the rule of Williams proved easy to state but hard to 
apply.  In Andrade v. Attorney General of the State of California, for 
example, the Ninth Circuit determined that the state court committed 
“clear error,”92 a standard that, according to its own precedent, occupied 
a middle ground between the poles suggested by Judge Newman.93  The 
Supreme Court rejected the “clear error” formulation as “not the same” 
as objective unreasonableness.94  As a semantic matter, that was of 
course true, but the Court provided virtually no analysis to explain what 
the substantive difference between the two standards was, instead 
repeating that Williams required a denial of the writ unless the state 
court’s application of law was objectively unreasonable (and finding the 
 
 87. Id. at 410. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 91. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 92. 270 F.3d 743, 753 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d sub nom. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
 93. See Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We believe that the clear 
error standard occupies the middle ground that the Williams Court marked out when it rejected the 
arguments of those who contended that an independent determination of prejudicial error by a federal 
court was sufficient and of those who argued for the overly deferential ‘reasonable jurists’ standard.”).   
 94. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75. 
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state courts’ decision not so).95 
Scholars and courts were therefore left to muddle through how to 
apply the objective reasonableness standard.  The leading habeas treatise 
noted that all three opinions in Williams, including Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissent, established that under both clauses of § 2254(d)(1), 
the federal court must review not only the ultimate judgment of the state 
court but also its reasoning.96  Moreover, it added, “In sharp contrast to 
some of the preexisting lower court caselaw, which had read section 
2254(d)(1) to require virtually abject ‘deference’ to state court 
judgments, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion . . . noticeably steered 
clear of any use of the term ‘deference.’”97   
Although the Court did not further elucidate the AEDPA standard 
explicitly, it did apply it in a manner consistent with the approach taken 
in Williams in subsequent ineffective assistance of counsel cases.  In 
Wiggins v. Smith, the Court faulted the state court for assuming that the 
petitioner’s trial attorneys’ mitigation investigation was adequate instead 
of considering whether their decision to cease investigating after 
receiving a presentence report and social services records demonstrated 
reasonable professional judgment.98 In Rompilla v. Beard, the defense 
attorneys failed to examine the defendant’s prior conviction file, which 
would have informed them about a wealth of mitigation evidence and 
also prepared them to defend against the State’s use of the prior 
conviction as aggravation.  The Court went through that evidence, 
painstakingly explaining why it mattered to Rompilla’s ineffective 
assistance claim, and held that “the conclusion of the state court fails to 
answer the considerations we have set out, to the point of being an 
objectively unreasonable conclusion.”99  And, in Porter v. McCollum, 
the Court held that the state court’s finding that the petitioner could not 
establish the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim was unreasonable because the state court “either did not consider 
or unreasonably discounted the mitigation evidence adduced in the 
postconviction hearing.”100  In all these cases, the Supreme Court looked 
at what the state court actually did in adjudicating the case, faulted it for 
overlooking some material fact or element of applicable law, and found 




 95. Id. at 76–77.  See also Ides, Standards, supra note 25, at 741-48 (criticizing the Court for 
making “absolutely no effort to get beneath the skin of the Ninth Circuit standard”). 
 96. RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 32.3, at 1809 (6th ed. 2011). 
 97. Id. at 1832. 
 98. 539 U.S. 510, 527 (2003). 
 99. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 389 (2005). 
 100. 558 U.S. 30, 42–43 (2009). 
 101. See also Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1390 (2012) (analyzing, post-Richter, state 
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The assumption following Williams, therefore, was that while the 
Supreme Court had raised the standard from de novo review, the new 
“unreasonable application” standard was by no means insurmountable 
and simply required an analysis of what the state court had actually 
done, to determine whether the steps it took were objectively reasonable 
or not.102 
3. Interregnum: Yarborough v. Alvarado 
Although the fairminded jurists appeared to be banished to the 
netherworld of rejected standards in Williams, they reemerged briefly in 
a 2004 case in which Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court in a 5–4 
opinion103 reversing the Ninth Circuit’s grant of the writ.  In Yarborough 
v. Alvarado, Alvarado was a seventeen-year-old accused of helping a 
co-defendant steal a truck, a scheme that led to the murder of the truck’s 
owner (by the co-defendant).  Alvarado was taken in for questioning and 
confessed.104  The issue before the state courts was whether he was in 
custody at the time of the confession.  The California courts concluded 
that, under the circumstances, a reasonable person in Alvarado’s 
situation would have felt free to leave.  On federal habeas, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the state courts were unreasonable to ignore Alvarado’s 
youth in determining the custody question, and that this amounted to an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as 
determined by the Supreme Court because “the relevance of juvenile 
status in Supreme Court caselaw as a whole compelled the ‘extension of 
the principle that juvenile status is relevant’ to . . . custody 
determinations.”105 
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling was questionable on the “clearly 
established law” prong of the § 2254(d)(1) analysis since the Supreme 
Court at that time had not held that age was relevant to the custody 
inquiry.106  The Circuit seemed to recognize as much when it 
 
court’s adjudication of ineffective assistance of counsel claim and finding that state court’s failure to 
apply the correct test was contrary to clearly established law). 
 102. Some scholars argued that after Williams, the AEDPA standard really made no difference in 
the rate of success for habeas petitioners at all, and that the statute was all “hype” and no” bite.  John H. 
Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259 (2006).  But see Marceau, 
Challenging Habeas Process, supra note 31, at 100–05 (results of empirical analysis showing that, 
reviewing a broader sample of Supreme Court cases, evidence now suggests, contrary to Professor 
Blume, that “AEDPA’s bite has become severe”).   
 103. Justice O’Connor joined the opinion, but wrote separately to express an additional reason 
that the writ should not be granted.  Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 669 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).   
 104. Id. at 658. 
 105. Id. at 660 (quoting Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841, 853 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 106. It later did in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394 (2011). 
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characterized the rule as an “extension” of the Supreme Court’s caselaw.  
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “if a habeas court must 
extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand,” then it likely 
was not “clearly established at the time of the state-court decision,”107 
and, in this case, the Court’s precedent had not established that age was 
a mandatory consideration.108 
On the “unreasonable application” question, the Court repeated the 
refrain from Williams that “’unreasonable’ is ‘a common term in the 
legal world and, accordingly, federal judges are familiar with its 
meaning.’”109  Justice Kennedy then added, without citation to any 
controlling habeas precedent,110 “At the same time, the range of 
reasonable judgment can depend in part on the nature of the relevant 
rule.  If a legal rule is specific, the range may be narrow.”111  By 
contrast, he stated, “[o]ther rules are more general, and their meaning 
must emerge in application over the course of time.  Applying a general 
standard to a specific case can demand a substantial element of 
judgment.”112  Justice Kennedy then stated, “Ignoring the deferential 
standard of § 2254(d)(1) for the moment, it can be said that fairminded 
jurists could disagree over whether Alvarado was in custody.”113  This 
statement seems abstruse in the context of a discussion of the 
unreasonable application clause.  Why ignore the standard when you are 
applying it?  Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy concluded that there were 
facts supporting both sides of the custody question, and therefore stated 
for the Court, “These differing indications lead us to hold that the state 
court’s application of our custody standard was reasonable.”114   
Judith Ritter has argued that the use of the “fairminded jurists could 
disagree” formulation in Alvarado was dictum because (a) there was no 
need to apply the unreasonable application bar because the Court 
 
 107. The Court left some ambiguity in this rule, noting that “the difference between applying a 
rule and extending it is not always clear.”  Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 666.  But see White v. Woodall, 134 S. 
Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014) (“‘[I]f a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts at 
hand,’ then by definition the rationale was not ‘clearly established at the time of the state-court 
decision.’” (quoting Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 666) (emphasis added)).  
 108. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 666–67. 
 109. Id. at 663-65.   
 110. Justice Kennedy cited his own concurrence in a pre-AEDPA habeas case, Wright v. West, 
explaining that in the Teague context, “[w]hether the prisoner seeks the application of an old rule in a 
novel setting depends in large part on the nature of the rule. If the rule in question is one which of 
necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence, then we can tolerate a number of specific 
applications without saying that those applications themselves create a new rule.”  505 U.S. 277, 308–09 
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted)).   
 111. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 664.  
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 665. 
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essentially said the state court’s decision was correct even under de novo 
review; and (b) the Court’s remark that it was “[i]gnoring the deferential 
standard of § 2254(d)(1)” suggests that it “disassociated its reference to 
fair-minded jurists from the unreasonable application clause.”115  Justice 
Kennedy’s phrase is “puzzling,”116 for at least two other reasons:  First, 
as just mentioned, the Court in Alvarado also ruled that there was not 
clearly established law as determined by the Supreme Court on the 
relevance of Alvarado’s youth.  Therefore, the entire unreasonable 
application analysis may be said to be dicta.  Second, as Ritter also 
notes,117  Alvarado did not suggest that it was overturning that part of 
Williams that rejected the fairminded disagreement standard, or that 
fairminded disagreement was in any way the new test courts should use 
to assess the unreasonable application clause.118  Instead, it cited 
Williams as the controlling standard. 
Alvarado’s use of the fairminded disagreement standard accordingly 
might have faded into juridical oblivion.  But, as will be seen, dicta in 
Supreme Court opinions often operate by the Chekovian rule of drama 
that pistols left hanging on walls must eventually be fired.119 
4. Alvarado Redux in Richter 
In Richter, Justice Kennedy cited Alvarado to reconfigure the habeas 
standard, stating: “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit 
precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could 
disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.”120  The 
internal quotes signaled the Court’s citation to Alvarado’s statement, 
“Ignoring the deferential standard of § 2254(d)(1) for the moment, it can 
be said that fairminded jurists could disagree over whether Alvarado 
was in custody.”  Of course, the Court had dropped the “[i]gnoring the 
deferential standard” portion of the sentence.  The Court went on to 
describe § 2254(d)’s barrier to relief as involving a “no fairminded jurist 
could disagree” test several more times in the opinion, saying, 
“[AEDPA] preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is 
no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s 
 
 115. Ritter, Voice of Reason, supra note 7, at 66–67. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at 67. 
 118. Justice O’Connor apparently did not see any inconsistency with her opinion in Williams as 
she joined Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion. 
 119. DONALD RAYFIELD, ANTON CHEKOV: A LIFE 203 (1998) (“If in Act I you have a pistol 
hanging on the wall, then it must fire in the last act.”). 
 120. 562 U.S. at 101 (emphasis added) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 
(2004)). 
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decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents.  It goes no farther,”121 
and, “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a 
state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being 
presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was 
an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 
possibility for fairminded disagreement.”122  Again, the Supreme Court 
did not suggest that it was overruling Williams—it relied on it.  But 
Justice Kennedy’s statement of the standard worked a metamorphosis on 
the caselaw, reviving the fairminded jurists test from its doctrinal torpor.  
The Alvarado pistol had been fired.   
III. WHAT RICHTER HAS WROUGHT: CONFUSION AND CONSTERNATION 
IN THE COURTS AND SCHOLARSHIP 
Following the passage of AEDPA and the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Williams, scholars debated how the “unreasonable application” clause 
should be interpreted and struggled to develop a workable standard for 
adjudicating habeas cases.123  Following Richter, however, scholars have 
not yet grappled with the meaning of the fairminded disagreement 
standard, beyond a forming consensus that the new standard makes 
habeas relief harder to obtain—perhaps catastrophically so.  Professor 
Ritter has described the Richter standard as “dangerous and improper” 
and has argued, “Far more than deference, this test requires 
acquiescence.”124  Professor Marceau has called it “one of the most 
uncharitable standards of review known to law.”125  Others have 
described it as “super-deferential,”126 “completely untethered from 
Supreme Court precedent,”127 and, even more dramatically, “an 
unworkable . . . standard that fundamentally contradicts American 
common law decision-making.”128 
 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 102; see also id. (“Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or 
theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask 
whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent 
with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.”).  
 123. See, e.g., Ides, Standards, supra note 25; Todd E. Pettys, Federal Habeas Relief and the New 
Tolerance for “Reasonably Erroneous” Applications of Federal, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 792–93 (2002); 
Liebman & Ryan, supra note 32; Larry Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. 
L. REV. 381 (1996). 
 124. Ritter, Voice of Reason, supra note 7, at 77, 86. 
 125. Marceau, Challenging Habeas Process, supra note 31, at 97. 
 126. Michael M. O’Hear, Bypassing Habeas: The Right to Effective Assistance Requires Earlier 
Supreme Court Intervention in Cases of Attorney Incompetence, 25 FED. SENT’G. REP. 110, 115 (2012). 
127.  Reinhardt, Demise of Habeas, supra note 7, at 1228. 
 128. Ruth A. Moyer, Disagreement About Disagreement: The Effect of a Circuit Split or “Other 
Circuit” Authority on the Availability of Federal Habeas Relief for State Convicts, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 
831, 857 (2014) [hereinafter Moyer, Circuit Splits]. 
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The impact of the new standard in the Supreme Court appears to bear 
out these fears.  Since Richter, the Court has cited the fairminded jurists 
test in numerous cases as the standard a petitioner must meet to 
surmount § 2254(d)’s barriers to relief.129  As of this writing, habeas 
petitioners have lost every one of those cases.  That is not a particularly 
persuasive piece of evidence, however, since the Court has rarely sided 
with the habeas petitioner since Williams,130 and, due to AEDPA’s 
procedural barriers, a prisoner has many ways to lose. 
A more informative and nuanced picture of the standard emerges 
upon examination of the reactions in the lower courts.  Because habeas 
decisions make up such a substantial proportion of federal dockets, I 
limit my exploration to circuit decisions.  Such decisions are rarer—and  
the calls are generally closer—because of the barriers AEDPA erected to 
obtaining a certificate of appealability.
131
  The two primary responses to 
Richter in the circuit courts have been a recapitulation of the subjective 
standard rejected in Williams, and an objective standard that focuses 
solely on the ultimate result of the state court decision.  This Article now 
turns to these two interpretations.      
A. The Subjective View 
The subjective view, expressed in some circuit court opinions, reads 
Richter as not just elevating AEDPA standard, but as changing it 
fundamentally to something that looks remarkably unlike objective 
reasonableness.  Take, for example, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in a 
2012 case, Peak v. Webb.  The two judges in the majority, Danny Boggs 
and Gilbert Merritt, each issued opinions explaining their view that 
 
 129. Davis v. Ayala, No. 13-1428, slip op. at 12 (U.S. June 18, 2015); Woods v. Donald, 135 S. 
Ct. 1372, 1377 (2015) (per curiam); White v. Woodall, 134 C. St. 1697, 1702–03 (2014); Burt v. Titlow, 
134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (applied in § 2254(d)(2) context);  Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1992 
(2013) (per curiam); Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1787 (2013); Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 
2148, 2155 (2012) (per curiam); Wetzel v. Lambert, 132 S. Ct. 1195, 1198 (2012) (per curiam); Bobby 
v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 27 (2011) (per curiam); Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1402 (2011).  
Ironically, a case decided the same day as Richter, also reversing a habeas grant on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim (and also written by Justice Kennedy), did not mention the fairminded 
disagreement standard.  Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115 (2011). 
 130. But see Brumfield v. Cain, No. 13-1433 (U.S. June 18, 2015); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 
1376 (2012); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (per curiam); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 
930 (2007); Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233 (2007); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).  Notably, in both Brumfield and Lafler, the only of these cases 
decided after Richter, the Court did not cite the fairminded disagreement test, though that may be 
because neither case was decided on the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1).  The 
dissents in both cases, however, emphasized the Richter standard.  See Brumfield, slip op. at 20-21 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1396 (Scalia, J., dissenting)..  For a full scorecard of post-
AEDPA Supreme Court habeas decisions, see Marceau, Challenging Habeas Process, supra note 31. 
 131. See infra notes 174–76. 
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Richter raised the bar to habeas relief higher than the plain language of 
AEDPA or its prior interpretation in Williams.132 Judge Boggs further 
held that “[t]hough the trial court may well have violated Peak’s 
constitutional rights . . . we cannot say, as the Supreme Court now 
requires, that fairminded jurists could not disagree with our opinion . . . .  
In fact, four such fairminded justices of the Kentucky Supreme Court 
did disagree.  Therefore, we are compelled to affirm.”133  In other words, 
the mere existence of disagreement—among presumably fairminded 
judges—was dispositive.  In dissent, Judge Eric Clay argued that by 
deferring to the sum of state court judges who agreed with the trial 
court, “[t]he majority erroneously defers to the Kentucky Supreme Court 
justices’ status as state court judges, rather than their legal analysis.”134   
In other cases, where panels have decided to grant the writ, judges 
have dissented by pointing, like Judge Boggs, to the number of state 
judges who denied relief to a habeas petitioner.  Tallying these state 
court judges, they have stated, as Judge Richard Tallman of the Ninth 
Circuit did (with sarcastic understatement), “Presumably at least some 
of them were ‘fairminded jurists.’”135  Likewise, in a recent dissent from 
a panel’s grant of habeas relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson III of the Fourth Circuit wrote: “[T]he 
majority’s decision runs up against the striking fact that before today, no 
court had ever found that the conduct of [petitioner]’s counsel resulted 
in constitutional prejudice. . . .  [T]he majority has reached the 
remarkable conclusion that every single judge to have previously 
considered this issue has been unreasonable.”136  The Ninth Circuit 
majority in the case involving Judge Tallman responded like Judge 
Clay, arguing that under AEDPA, “The emphasis is clearly on 
application of law rather than on counting noses.”137   
 
 132. 673 F.3d 465, 473–74 n.12 (6th Cir. 2012); id. at 474 (Merritt, J., concurring). 
 133. Id. at 467 (Op. of Boggs., J.); accord id. at 473–74 (“It is not unreasonable to believe, as did 
at least three justices on the Kentucky Supreme Court, as well as the trial-court judge, that confrontation 
only requires that a declarant be made available in the courtroom for a criminal defendant to call during 
his own case.”).   
 134. Id. at 487 (Clay, J., dissenting).  Judge Clay also argued that no case before or after Richter 
suggested that the Supreme Court was doing away with or otherwise amending the “objective 
reasonableness” standard from Williams, and, accordingly, the “fairminded jurists” test should be treated 
as equivalent to the Williams standard. Id. (Clay, J., dissenting). “[G]iven the number of AEDPA cases 
decided by the Supreme Court in recent years,” Judge Clay argued, “it is safe to assume that had the 
Supreme Court sought to raise the Williams level of deference to be given to state court judgments, it 
would have said so.”   Id. at 486-87 (Clay, J., dissenting).  
 135. Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986, 1049 (9th Cir. 2011) (Tallman, J., dissenting); accord Amado 
v. Gonzalez, 734 F.3d 936, 955 (9th Cir. 2013) withdrawn and superseded on denial of reh’g en banc, 
758 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2014) (Rawlinson J., dissenting) (“I agree with the presumably fairminded 
district court that the state court did not unreasonably apply Brady.”).   
 136. Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783, 876–77 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
 137. Doody, 649 F.3d at 1007 n.6 (internal citation omitted).  Just before the publication of this 
26
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol83/iss4/7
2015] BEYOND A REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT 1363 
Similarly, circuit judges have begun to cite the agreement of federal 
judges with the state courts as proof-positive that the state decision 
cannot be deemed unreasonable.  In Young v. Conway, a recent 
(unsuccessful) effort at en banc review of a panel decision granting the 
writ, Judge Reena Raggi of the Second Circuit pointed to the split 
among state court judges on the issue, tallying ten state court judges—
six New York Court of Appeals judges, three Appellate Division judges, 
and the trial judge—who voted against the petitioner versus three who 
voted in his favor.138  “In such circumstances,” she wrote, “the fact that 
the panel shares the minority view is not enough to denominate the 
majority view ‘unreasonable.’”139  Moreover, Judge Raggi added, she 
and the two other circuit judges who joined her dissent agreed with the 
state courts—a fact that, in her view, should compel a finding that their 
decision was within the range of reasonable disagreement.140  Echoing 
Judge Raggi’s reliance on a split among federal judges, Judge Thomas 
Hardiman of the Third Circuit recently wrote:  
The existence of a circuit split demonstrates that it is wrong to 
conclude that fairminded jurists could [not] disagree on the 
correctness of the state court’s decision in this case. . . .  The mere 
fact of a difference of opinion among courts of appeals leads 
ineluctably to the conclusion that a state court cannot run afoul of 
AEDPA regardless of which of these two paths it chooses.141 
What is apparent from these opinions is that federal judges have 
begun to cite the reasonableness of the decision-makers, as opposed to 
the decision, as grounds to deny habeas relief.142  Of course, these 
 
Article, the Supreme Court decided Davis v. Ayala, reversing yet another Ninth Circuit habeas grant, 
involving the application of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  In the Court’s opinion, Justice 
Alito engaged in the very rhetorical practice of nose-counting described here, stating: “In this case, the 
conscientious trial judge determined that the strikes at issue were not based on race, and his judgment 
was entitled to great weight.  On appeal, five justices of the California Supreme Court carefully 
evaluated the record and found no basis to reverse.  A Federal District Judge denied habeas relief, but a 
divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court and found that the California Supreme 
Court had rendered a decision with which no fairminded jurist could agree.”  Ayala, No. 13-1428, slip 
op. at 29 (June 18, 2015).   
 138. 715 F.3d 79, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (Raggi, J., dissenting from denial of en banc). 
 139. Id.; accord id. at 102 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (“Even though ten state court 
judges . . . concluded that the record satisfied Wade’s independent-source requirement, the panel 
inexplicably holds that such a conclusion is an unreasonable application of federal law and not one upon 
which ‘fairminded jurists could disagree.’” (internal citation omitted)). 
 140. Id. at 95–96 (Raggi, J., dissenting) (arguing that judge writing for majority “plainly disagrees 
with [Richter]’s strict standard of unreasonableness, concerned that few, if any, habeas cases will satisfy 
it”).   
 141. Garrus v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 694 F.3d 394, 416 (3d Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Hardiman, 
J., dissenting). 
 142. The Supreme Court’s use of the word “fairminded” as opposed to “reasonable” in describing 
the jurists is significant here as it tends to invite an examination of the jurist’s mind, rather than what she 
27
Biale: Beyond a Reasonable Disagreement:  Judging Habeas Corpus
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2015
1364 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83 
opinions do not rely exclusively on the fairmindedness of the state court 
judges—the federal judges quoted above make the case that their state 
court counterparts correctly adjudicated the merits.  So the counting of 
noses may simply be overheated rhetoric.  Moreover, the number of 
close cases in which such rhetoric might make a difference to the result 
will likely be small, since the Williams “objective reasonableness” 
threshold is already difficult to overcome.143  But we can imagine a case 
where it would make a difference: where the state court’s decision 
involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, 
yet the federal court denies relief based on a presumption that the state 
court judge herself was nonetheless fairminded.  Further, even if these 
subjective arguments amount to a mere “linguistic shift,”144 they are 
significant because they reinforce the notion that Richter made the 
habeas standard more exacting—and thereby made the writ harder to 
obtain.  No one wants to accuse a fellow jurist of lacking a personal 
characteristic necessary for judging,145 so judicial rhetoric may, in fact, 
matter in close cases.  The Richter standard consequently increases the 
discursive stakes of finding a state court decision unreasonable, and 
concomitantly increases the discomfort of granting habeas relief.  Far 
easier simply to say: some judges think one thing; others think 
something else; all are fairminded—petition denied.146   
But, as should be clear from the historical discussion above, the 
subjective view cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s habeas 
doctrine.  Like Alvarado, Richter nowhere suggested that it was 
overturning that part of Williams that rejected the Fourth Circuit’s “all 
fairminded jurists” test.147  No justice remarked on the change to the 
 
actually does to adjudicate the claim. 
 143. See generally NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT (2011) (reviewing meager success 
rate of non-capital habeas petitions post-AEDPA but prior to Richter).  
 144. Huq, Habeas & Roberts, supra note 12, at 539. 
 145. There are, of course, counterexamples but they reveal how charged the rhetoric sometimes 
becomes in these cases.  In granting habeas relief to a prisoner he found to be actually innocent, Judge 
Nicholas Garaufis of the Eastern District of New York cited the “wrongdoing” committed by “the 
incomprehensible [state court judge], who so regrettably failed time and time again to give meaningful 
consideration to the host of powerful arguments [petitioner] presented to her.”  Lopez v. Miller, 915 F. 
Supp. 2d 373, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).  
 146. Similarly in the field of journalism, critics have contended that reporters may feel compelled 
simply to present both sides of story in order to achieve “balance,” rather than investigate who is telling 
the truth.  See, e.g., Brent Cunningham, Re-thinking Objectivity, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (July-Aug 
2003), http://www.cjr.org/feature/rethinking_objectivity.php?page=all.  In this way, the quest for 
objectivity can actually lead to a form of relativism.  The subjectivism that is creeping into some circuit 
opinions applying the fairminded disagreement test in habeas cases risks creating a similar form of 
judicial relativism, where the mere fact of differing opinions requires judges to throw up their hands, 
ignore the legal questions presented by the case, and simply rule against the petitioner.   
 147. To the contrary, it cited Williams twice as the governing standard.  Harrington v. Richter, 
562 U.S. 86, 100–01 (2011).  See also Reinhardt, Demise of Habeas, supra note 7, at 1228 (noting that 
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standard a separate opinion (though Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in 
the judgment indicated that she found Richter’s claim non-meritorious, 
suggesting that she disapproved of the Court’s attempt to raise 
AEDPA’s bar).148  Accordingly, whatever the Richter standard means, it 
cannot be the subjective “all fairminded jurists” test that was rejected in 
Williams.  The “subjective view”—applying deference to state court 
judges’ status as judges—therefore does not square with habeas 
doctrine.  The Supreme Court has firmly rejected that standard and has 
given no indication that it intended to overrule Williams.  Accordingly, 
the practice of “counting noses” that some circuit judges have engaged 
in since Richter is wrong.   
B. The Objective, “Ultimate Result” View 
In rejecting the subjective view of the fairminded disagreement 
standard, some judges and scholars have argued that Richter did not 
alter the Williams standard at all, and that fairminded disagreement is 
just another way of saying objective reasonableness.149  I think that this 
is an overly optimistic view of what the Court was doing in Richter.  In 
both tone and substance, Justice Kennedy’s opinion plainly meant to 
raise the threshold for obtaining habeas relief.  The question therefore 
becomes: what does an objective fairminded disagreement standard 
mean, and when should it be applied? 
First, it should be noted that, like objective reasonableness, the 
fairminded disagreement standard appears in multiples areas of law.  
“Beyond fairminded disagreement” or “beyond fairminded debate” is a 
standard sometimes used in plain error review,150 Federal Rule of Civil 
 
the tension with Williams “did not seem to bother the Court, as it acknowledged no shift in its approach 
to AEDPA review despite the fact that it adopted nearly the same test it had previously rejected”). 
 148. See id. at 113-14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The strong force of the prosecution’s 
case . . . was not significantly reduced by the affidavits offered in support of Richter’s habeas petition.  I 
would therefore not rank counsel’s lapse so serious as to deprive [Richter] of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable.  For that reason, I concur in the Court’s judgment.” (alteration in original) (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted).   
 149. The argument that Richter did not alter the objective reasonableness standard from Williams 
has been made by judges and advocates alike.  See Peak v. Webb, 673 F.3d 465, 486 (2012) (Clay, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that “fairminded jurists” test should be treated as equivalent to Williams standard); 
Br. for Amicus Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Lawyers Supporting Respondent, at 19-20, White v. 
Woodal, 134 S. Ct. 1697 (2014) (No. 12-794), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v3/12-
794_resp_amcu_nacdl.authcheckdam.pdf (cert petition by Professors Marceau and Lee Kovarsky noting 
warden’s reliance on split circuit panel to argue that reasonable jurists could disagree on merits issue, 
and arguing, “Whatever ‘fair-minded disagreement’ means, it cannot mean a return of the ‘all-
reasonable-jurists’ scenario unless this Court meant to overrule, sub silencio, the statutory interpretation 
in Williams.”). 
 150. See, e.g., Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). 
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Procedure 50(b) motions for judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict,151 
and patent infringement cases.152  As Professor Ides has discussed, it is 
really a standard of “rational” disagreement, insofar as “a court will 
uphold an actor’s choice so long as the choice remains within the 
permissible range of alternatives and can be deemed to have been a 
rational choice among those alternatives.”153   
Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Alvarado and Richter have similarly 
framed the application of the standard as depending on the range of 
permissible results.  “The more general the rule,” he stated in both cases, 
“‘the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case 
determinations.’”154  Both Richter and Alvarado involved such general 
rules, in Justice Kennedy’s view, because both of the underlying rules 
(ineffective assistance of counsel and custody) themselves turn on 
standards of reasonableness.  Accordingly, courts might construe the 
standard as applying only when there is a general legal standard applied 
to the facts of a case, where multiple results could plausibly be 
correct.155  In such a case, the existence of multiple plausibly correct 
results would be sufficient to render the state court’s decision reasonable 
and preclude habeas relief.156 
This formulation is intuitively congruent with objective 
reasonableness analysis: if two options are plausibly correct resolutions 
of the merits of a claim, then either one is ipso facto reasonable.  It also 
supports a mode of adjudicating habeas petitions that some scholars 
have called an “ultimate result” approach,157 whereby the federal court 
does not consider any of the actual steps the state court took in 
adjudicating the claim; instead it merely looks at the ultimate result of 
the state court’s decision and asks whether that result is at least arguably 
 
 151. See, e.g., The Chedd-Angier Prod. Co. v. Omni Pub. Int’l, Inc., No. Civ.A. 81-1188-MA, 
1984 WL 478431, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 5, 1985), aff’d 756 F.2d 930 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 152. See, e.g., Fargo Elec., Inc. v. Iris Ltd., Inc., No. 04-1017 JRT/FLN, 2005 WL 3241851, at *4 
(D. Minn. Nov. 30, 2005). 
 153. Ides, Standards, supra note 25, at 689. 
 154. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alavarado, 541 U.S. 
652, 664 (2004)). 
 155. This limitation was endorsed in an early scholarly assessment of Williams.  See Pettys, supra 
note 123, at 792-93 (arguing that reasonableness should be determined based on whether the applicable 
federal law “appears in the form” of a rule or standard). 
 156. Ironically, this is remarkably similar to the “clear error” standard.  See Anderson v. City of 
Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (“Where there are two permissible views of the 
evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”).  Recall, however, that the 
Court rejected that standard as insufficiently deferential in Andrade, see discussion at note 94, supra.   
 157. See Pet. for Writ of Cert., Charles v. Stephens, No. 13-9639 (U.S. Apr. 8, 2014) (petition by 
Professor Kovarsky arguing that the ultimate result approach misapplies Richter).  The debate about 
whether AEDPA requires deference to state court opinions or state court results in fact predates Richter.  
See Adam N. Steinman, Reconceptualizing Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: How Should 
AEDPA’s Standard of Review Operate After Williams v. Taylor?, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1493, 1511 (2001). 
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correct.  Since Richter, some courts have adopted this approach and 
framed it as a two-step inquiry:  First, the federal court must “’determine 
what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the 
state court’s decision.’”158  Second, the court asks “whether it is possible 
fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are 
inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] 
Court.”159  In other words, as Judge Guido Calabresi of the Second 
Circuit recently explained (derisively), the federal court is meant to 
“imagine what reasons the state court might have had for its 
conclusion[,]” and, if those “imagined reasons . . . are not so incorrect 
under Supreme Court holdings that [the court] could not imagine ‘fair-
minded jurists’ would approve of them,” habeas relief must be denied.160   
Although the first step of the “ultimate result” approach contemplates 
looking at “what arguments or theories supported” the state court 
decision, this inquiry is unnecessary if the federal court can imagine a 
reasonable theory to support the result.  Whether or not the state court 
mentions that reasonable theory is irrelevant.  As the Eighth Circuit 
recently put it, “Just as there is more than one way to skin a cat, there 
often is more than one way to resolve an appeal, and not every possible 
approach makes it into an opinion.”161  So, to summarize the approach: 
where the state court applies a “general” legal rule, the possibility of 
reasonable disagreement on the correct ultimate result is sufficient to 
preclude a finding that the state court was unreasonable.   
All of this sounds quite consistent with objective reasonableness, but 
closer examination reveals numerous flaws with the debatable ultimate 
result approach, including: (1) framing the test as a sufficient condition 
 
 158. Eley v. Erickson, 712 F.3d 837, 846 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter,  562 U.S. 
86, 102 (2011)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).  The omission of the original language in 
Richter, “or, as here, could have supported” removes what may be interpreted as a limitation on 
Richter’s reach, cabining the decision to apply only to state decisions issued without a reasoned opinion.  
See Pet. for Writ of Cert., Charles v. Stephens, No. 13-9639, at 18–19 (U.S. Apr. 8, 2014).  Since 
Richter, however, the circuits have split on whether the opinion’s “could have supported” language for 
decisions unaccompanied by a reasoned opinion applies to decisions that do include a reasoned opinion.  
Compare Trottie v. Stephens, 720 F.3d 231, 241 (5th Cir. 2013) (“We review only the ultimate legal 
determination by the state court—not every link in its reasoning.”); Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825, 
832–33, 837 (8th Cir. 2012) (“As we understand Richter and Moore, the Court's opinions were premised 
on the text of § 2254(d) and the meaning of ‘decision’ and ‘unreasonable application,’ not on 
speculation about whether the state court actually had in mind reasons that were ‘reasonable’ when it 
denied relief.”) with Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding Richter is 
limited to summary denials and that the federal court may “look through” state high court’s summary 
denial to evaluate reasoning of a lower court in denying claim); Johnson v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corr., 643 
F.3d 907, 930 n.9 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The Court's instruction from [Richter] does not apply here because 
the Florida Supreme Court did provide an explanation of its decision . . . .”); Sussman v. Jenkins, 642 
F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 2011) (same). 
 159. Eley, 712 F.3d at 846 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 160. Hawthorne, 695 F.3d at 199 (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
 161. Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d at 837. 
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for the denial of habeas relief is actually equivalent to the standard 
rejected in Williams; (2) the test cannot be reconciled with the operation 
of habeas in a federal system because granting the writ will always 
require disagreement about the merits; (3) the test adds unnecessary 
confusion to the framework of AEDPA; (4) the test scrambles the 
elements of § 2254(d)(1); and (5) the purported limitation on the test’s 
application is illusory. 
1. The Fairminded Disagreement Test is Logically Equivalent to 
the Rejected All-Fairminded Jurists Test 
In order for the fairminded disagreement test to be consistent with 
Williams, it must fall somewhere within the spectrum of standards that 
Williams permitted.  We know that the lower end of the spectrum is a 
judgment that the state court decision is simply erroneous.  That is not 
sufficient for habeas relief.  On the high end, we know that Williams 
requires less than universal consensus among all fairminded jurists, 
since that was the rejected Fourth Circuit standard.  Richter’s 
fairminded jurists test must be somewhere in between these poles.  As 
just discussed, Justice Kennedy’s articulation of the standard in 
Alvarado and Richter supposes that fairminded disagreement about the 
merits of the claim is merely a sufficient condition for the state court 
decision to be reasonable, while not requiring universal consensus.  
Reduced to a logical proposition, the assumption is: 
Possibility of fairminded disagreement → Reasonable result 
(Or, If fairminded disagreement is possible, then the result is 
reasonable.) 
The sufficient condition implies the necessary inverse: the 
reasonableness of the result is a necessary condition for fairminded 
jurists to disagree about it.  No problems with this formulation so far. 
However, if we assume the truth of the formulation above, then the 
contrapositive is also true: 
¬ reasonable result → ¬ possibility of fairminded disagreement 
(Or, if the result is unreasonable, then there is no possibility of 
fairminded disagreement.) 
Again, the sufficient condition—here an unreasonable result—implies 
the necessary inverse: No possibility of fairminded disagreement is a 
necessary condition for an unreasonable result.  But this is precisely the 
outcome that the Williams Court rejected: Universal consensus cannot 
be a necessary condition for the federal court to find an unreasonable 
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application of federal law.162  Although the Richter standard sounds 
much more modest—merely permitting fairminded disagreement as a 
sufficient condition for a reasonable decision—it is logically equivalent 
to the universal consensus standard forsworn in Williams.  Accordingly, 
fairminded disagreement, without more, cannot be a sufficient condition 
for the state court decision to be reasonable. 
2. The Fairminded Disagreement Test is Inconsistent with the 
Federal Structure of Habeas 
The notion that fairminded disagreement about the result is sufficient 
to preclude habeas relief is also inconsistent with the structure of habeas 
review in our federal system.  Although Justice O’Connor famously 
called a habeas decision announcing the Supreme Court’s strict 
procedural default “a case about federalism,”163 habeas doctrine has had 
a federalism component for only about 150 years (a relative blip in its 
eight-century history).  As Eve Brensike Primus has detailed, the 
Reconstruction Congress passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, in the 
same term that it passed the Fourteenth Amendment and created federal 
question and removal jurisdiction, in order to provide oversight for state 
courts thought to be systematically violating federal civil rights.164  As 
Professor Primus explains, “federal habeas review of state court 
criminal convictions was not only about emancipating wrongly 
convicted individuals; it was also about coercing reluctant states to 
enforce federal rights.”165  Thus, federal review of state courts’ failures 
to protect liberty is an underlying assumption of habeas corpus in our 
federal system, an assumption AEDPA left unchanged.166   
 
 162. One way of distinguishing these two tests is that Justice O’Connor criticized the Fourth 
Circuit’s Green test as permitting granting the writ only when the state court applied federal law “in a 
manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable,” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 
(2000) (emphasis added), as opposed to the Richter test that the writ could not be granted if “fairminded 
jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision,” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  There could be a difference in this distinction, as 
Justice O’Connor pointed out, the Green formulation requires an “additional overlay” of reasonableness 
review.  Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. But Green and the case it cited, the now-familiar Drinkard, both 
made clear that “‘an application of law to facts is unreasonable only when it can be said that reasonable 
jurists considering the question would be of one view that the state court ruling was incorrect.’”  Green 
v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 
1996)).  Thus, as a doctrinal matter, the two tests have not been distinguished on the basis of correctness 
vs. reasonableness. 
 163. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991). 
 164. Primus, Structural Habeas, supra note 15, at 13-14; see also generally ERIC FONER, 
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 (1988). 
 165. Primus, Structural Habeas, supra note 15, at 14. 
 166. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3) (“Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme 
Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective 
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has long recognized, and AEDPA 
codified, an exhaustion requirement, whereby state prisoners must pass 
through “one complete round” of the state’s appellate procedure in order 
for the federal court to consider the merits of their claims.167  Although 
exhaustion is not jurisdictional (and can be waived by the State), 
according to Lee Kovarsky, courts often treat it as though it is.168  
Consequently, except under certain narrow circumstances,169 no prisoner 
will have the merits of his federal claims considered by a federal court 
until a state court has already reviewed them.  And the prisoner will 
have no need to petition the federal court for review of those claims 
unless the state court has already rejected them. 
This means that no habeas petitioner comes to federal court without 
the prior existence of disagreement about the merits of his constitutional 
claims.  Such disagreement, on its own, cannot be sufficient for the 
denial of habeas relief, or habeas would become a nullity in a federal 
system.  As Judge Clay put it in his dissent in Peak, the fairminded 
disagreement standard threatens to make AEDPA’s threshold for relief 
“impossible to meet, as no habeas claim would reach our Court unless a 
jurist presumed to be fairminded had not already once decided the issue 
against the defendant.”170  Judge Barrington Parker of the Second 
Circuit sounded a similar alarm responding to Judge Raggi’s dissent 
from denial of en banc in Young v. Conway, writing, “If [Judge Raggi’s 
view] is correct, then habeas relief would never be available since the 
writ, by its nature, requires federal courts to, in the appropriate case, 
disagree with state judges on matters of federal law.”171  This is not 
 
jurisdictions . . . [if a state prisoner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of 
the United States.”). 
 167. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).  
Exhaustion was a Court-created requirement long before the enactment of AEDPA.  See Darr v. 
Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 210 n.30 (1950); see also O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499-500 (1974) 
(federal courts restrained in issuing injunctions that would interrupt ongoing state criminal 
prosecutions); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971).  But see Anthony G. Amsterdam, 
Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas 
Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 804 (1965) (arguing for 
removal of state prosecutions for conduct protected by federal constitutional guarantees of civil rights 
under federal removal jurisdiction and habeas corpus jurisdiction). 
 168. Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks, supra note 25, at 452. 
 169. Scholars have noted a possible opening in the Supreme Court’s recent cases that would 
permit de novo review of federal claims when a claim is procedurally defaulted, but that default is 
occasioned by ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel.  See Marceau, supra note 24, at 2143 
(“Specifically, when, because of the errors of postconviction counsel, a claim is not fully developed in 
state court proceedings, Martinez permits the prisoner to: (a) overcome the procedural default; and (b) 
avoid the strictures of § 2254(d) and, therefore, Richter and Pinholster.”). 
 170. Peak v. Webb, 673 F.3d 465, 487 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 171. Young v. Conway, 715 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2013) (Parker, J., concurring in the denial of en 
banc).  Judge Reinhardt makes the same point in his recent article, The Demise of Habeas Corpus, supra 
note 7, at 1229. 
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simply a reductio ad absurdum argument that the Supreme Court cannot 
have intended to eliminate federal habeas relief altogether.172  The 
Court, in fact, does not have the power to do so—only Congress has the 
constitutional authority to suspend the writ.173  The federal structure of 
habeas corpus review therefore suggests that more is needed beyond the 
possibility of disagreement on the merits for the federal court to 
determine that the state court’s adjudication of the claim was reasonable. 
3. The Fairminded Disagreement Test Adds Confusion to the 
AEDPA Framework 
The notion that fairminded disagreement on the merits is sufficient 
for denial of the writ also adds confusion to AEDPA framework 
because it duplicates a similar standard meant to create a low 
threshold for appellate review of habeas decisions.  AEDPA requires 
that habeas petitioners obtain a “certificate of appealability” before 
appealing an adverse decision from the federal district court to the Court 
of Appeals.174  The Supreme Court has held that the required showing 
for a certificate of appealability to issue is whether the petitioner can 
“demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s 
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”175  But 
debate among reasonable jurists about the merits of the claim also 
requires dismissal of the petition under the fairminded disagreement 
standard.  The granting of a certificate of appealability therefore 
presupposes an affirmance of the denial of habeas relief on the merits.  
District Judge Brian Cogan of the Eastern District of New York has 
written about this tension, calling the certificate of appealability 
standard and the Richter standard “hard to reconcile,” and adding, “The 
only possible means of reconciliation requires the conclusion that there 
must be some space between a district court’s review of a state court 
decision and the notional review of that district court’s decision by 
‘jurists of reason,’ however slight that space may be.”176   
Arguably these standards can be reconciled, since disagreement 
 
 172. Though the Court also made clear in Richter that it was not doing so.  See Harrington v. 
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (“As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a 
complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings.  It preserves 
authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the 
state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents.” (emphases added)). 
 173. See supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text. 
 174. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)-(2).   
 175. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 176. Anthoulis v. New York, No. 12 Civ. 6253(BMC), 2013 WL 5726154, at *8 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 21, 2013), aff’d 586 F. App’x 790 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Samuel v. LaValley, No. 12 Civ. 
2372(BMC), 2013 WL 550688, at *12 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2013) (using the same language).   
35
Biale: Beyond a Reasonable Disagreement:  Judging Habeas Corpus
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2015
1372 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83 
about whether a state court decision is correct might preclude habeas, 
but debate about whether that disagreement is reasonable could be 
grounds for a certificate of appealability.  In other words, the “space” 
between the two standards is the extent to which an issue may be 
debatably debatable.  While this reconciliation of the standards is 
(perhaps) theoretically coherent, however, courts will likely face 
increasing difficulty in applying these multiple layers of abstraction.  
Thus, the fairminded disagreement standard adds further confusion to 
an already complex statutory framework. 
4. The Test Scrambles the Elements of § 2254(d)(1) 
A further problem with Justice Kennedy’s articulation of the objective 
fairminded disagreement test is that it scrambles the “unreasonable 
application” and “clearly established Federal law” clauses of 
§ 2254(d)(1).  The Supreme Court has suggested, and at least one 
scholar has urged, that the existence of judicial disagreement about a 
point of law may be relevant to the question of whether that point of law 
is clearly established for AEDPA purposes.177  If the legal rule invoked 
is highly general, then its impact on a specific, new factual scenario may 
not be clearly established.178  Justice Kennedy’s characterizations of 
“general standard[s]” in Richter and Alvarado, which can only be 
unreasonably applied if the application is beyond fairminded 
disagreement, imports this requirement of specificity from the “clearly 
established Federal law” clause into the “unreasonable application” 
clause.  Importantly, this makes a factor that may be relevant in the 
former dispositive in the latter.179   
Moreover, if only prior cases with highly specific factual similarity to 
the habeas petitioner’s case can provide grounds for relief, the 
“unreasonable application” clause starts to collapse into the “contrary 
to” clause, permitting relief only when “the state court confronts a set of 
facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e 
Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] 
precedent.”180  The collapsing of these two distinct avenues to habeas 
relief under AEDPA is something that Justice O’Connor’s opinion in 
 
 177. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76 (2006); Moyer, Circuit Splits, supra note 128, at 
857–58 (noting that invocation of “reasonable jurists” test has created confusion about whether a circuit 
split determines that there is no clearly established Federal law on point). 
 178. But see Ursula Bentele, The Not So Great Writ: Trapped in the Narrow Holdings of Supreme 
Court Precedents, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 741, 759 (2010) (inveighing against this point). 
 179. See Moyer, Circuit Splits, supra note 128, at 866–67 (arguing reasonable jurist test should be 
scrapped, but that existence of circuit split should be relevant to “unreasonable application” analysis). 
 180. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000). 
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Williams attempted to prevent.181  Justice Kennedy’s opinions thus 
create substantial conceptual confusion that the Court has already taken 
pains to clear up. 
5. Cabining the Test to “General” Legal Rules is Illusory 
Finally, Justice Kennedy placed a purported limitation on the 
application of the objective fairminded disagreement test: only applying 
when the legal rule in question is a general standard.  But within the 
context of the typical merits claims in habeas cases, this is virtually no 
limitation at all.  The kinds of claims that are usually brought in habeas, 
especially ineffective assistance of counsel, involve multiple layers of 
reasonableness review and prejudice inquiries that make them highly 
fact-specific.182  The materiality component of prosecutorial misconduct 
claims similarly is a general standard that requires a fact-specific 
inquiry in case-by-case determinations.183  Even most trial error that 
involves the application of more formalistic legal rules is by and large 
subject to harmless error analysis that makes these legal rules operate 
like general standards.184  With very few exceptions, state appellate 
courts will be applying general standards to the facts of a case, so the 
leeway Justice Kennedy imagines in these cases—and the attendant 
problems just described—will feature across the board.185 
IV. THE “MORE” THAT UNREASONABLENESS REQUIRES: RETURNING 
PROCESS TO THE AEDPA ANALYSIS 
For all the reasons described so far—doctrinal reasons, reasons of 
logic, reasons of federalism, and reasons of practicability—
disagreement among fairminded jurists, without more, is insufficient to 
find a state court decision reasonable under AEDPA.  The question, 
then, is what more is needed?  What additional data should federal 
courts examine to determine whether a decision is reasonable or not?  
This Article will now argue that the process of adjudication in the state 
court provides that additional data.  By “process of adjudication,” I 
 
 181. Id. at 407. 
 182. See generally Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
 183. Montgomery v. Bobby, 654 F.3d 668, 678–79 (6th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 184. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Remarks at the Investiture of Eric M. Freedman As the Maurice 
A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, November 22, 2004, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 403, 
405–06 (Winter 2004) (noting these and other rules that have adopted results-oriented prejudice inquiry 
that “often boils down to whether the appellate judges think that the prosecution’s evidence of guilt was 
potent and the sentence well deserved”). 
 185. Habeas law also has its own built-in harmlessness analysis after one surmounts the 
substantive barriers of § 2254(d).  See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). 
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mean everything including the funding and appointment of defense 
counsel, the structure of state appellate review, the decision whether to 
hold an evidentiary hearing, the explanation of a decision in a reasoned 
opinion, and more.  The next Part will discuss the possible applications 
of a process-oriented framework.  But first, it is necessary to defend the 
focus on process.  I do so on several grounds: the scholarly consensus 
that such a focus is warranted; the consistency between a focus on 
process with habeas law and, perhaps surprisingly, AEDPA itself; and, 
finally, coherence with other areas of law, especially the law of 
constitutional torts. 
A. Process as an Underlying Theoretical Assumption to Habeas 
Debates 
The notion that state adjudicative processes should be considered as 
part of federal habeas review is not new.  Arguments for doing so have 
extended back to early critiques of the de novo standard in federal 
habeas cases.  Professor Bator’s famous broadside against the Warren 
Court’s habeas jurisprudence assumed that the states must provide fair 
process in order for their decisions to be respected on federal habeas.186  
This idea is enjoying a resurgence among scholars who, though 
vehemently disagreeing with Bator on the favorability of federal review, 
point to the state postconviction process as the best opportunity for 
habeas petitioners to develop their federal constitutional claims.187  
Indeed, as Professor Marceau has discussed, a requirement of “full and 
fair” state procedures is the common denominator between arguments 
against expansive habeas jurisdiction and contemporary critiques of 
AEDPA.188  So the idea of robust, fair state procedures is an underlying 
theoretical assumption of multiple views supporting a greater or lesser 
role for federal courts in collateral proceedings.   
B. Consistency with Habeas Law and AEDPA 
Further, although the idea that federal courts may scrutinize state 
 
 186. Bator, Finality, supra note 15, at 456–57. 
 187. See, e.g., Giovanna Shay, The New State Postconviction, 46 AKRON L. REV. 473 (2013); 
Marceau, Challenging Habeas Process, supra note 31; Lee Kovarsky, Maples and Martinez: Gideon for 
State Postconviction, PRAWFSBLAWG (Oct. 2, 2011), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/10/maples-v-thomas-and-martinez-v-ryan-gideon-in-
the-state-post-conviction-era.html; Seligman, Harrington’s Wake, supra note 46, at 499–500.  Notably, 
as Professor Kovarsky has pointed out elsewhere, a standard of review that assessed arbitrary process 
rather than unreasonable application of federal law was promoted (and ultimately rejected) for years 
prior to the passage of AEDPA.  Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks, supra note 25, at 459–65.   
 188. Marceau, Due Process, supra note 15, at 54–56. 
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procedures may seem anachronistic in the contemporary AEDPA era of 
federalism and comity, there is nothing inherently inconsistent about 
deferring to state court decisions while still encouraging particular 
procedures through the application of deference when states follow 
those procedures.  The Supreme Court in fact endorsed such a view in 
Teague v. Lane, recognizing that one of the purposes of federal habeas 
corpus review is to incentivize state courts to “conduct their proceedings 
in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards.”189   
AEDPA itself also contemplates the federal courts creating such 
incentives for the states by permitting an expedited federal habeas 
deadline for states that could establish that they had provided qualified, 
competent, adequately resourced, and adequately compensated post-
conviction counsel in capital cases.190  The statute also permits 
petitioners to circumvent the exhaustion requirements when “there is an 
absence of available State corrective process” or “circumstances exist 
that render such process ineffective to protect the rights” of the 
petitioner.191  The inclusion of these provisions in AEDPA reveals a 
system where federal courts can incentivize more robust state process to 
protect the rights of defendants consistently with the Act’s federalism 
and comity purposes.192   
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized, in applying 
AEDPA, that state adjudicative process affects the outcome of 
claims.  In Panetti v. Quarterman, the Court canvassed the 
procedural history of petitioner’s claim that his mental illness 
prohibited the State from carrying out the death penalty.
193
  Citing 
numerous irregularities in the state court’s adjudication of 
 
 189. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (plurality op.) (quoting Desist v. U.S., 394 U.S. 
244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  While Teague was decided 
prior to the enactment of AEDPA, § 2254(d)(1)’s “clearly established law” requirement has been 
thought to have codified Teague.  See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380 (2000) (pl. op. of Stevens, 
J.); but see Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011) (rejecting analogy between AEDPA and Teague 
and noting that retroactivity rules that govern federal habeas review on the merits are “quite separate 
from the relitigation bar imposed under AEDPA”). 
 190. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–2265 (2012).  AEDPA confers responsibility for determining 
whether the states were eligible for such expedited procedures to the federal courts.  However, the USA 
Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 2261, 120 Stat. 192, 250 
(2006), amended the statute to shift the eligibility determination from the courts to the Attorney General.  
This expedited deadline is not without controversy.  Habeas litigators in California have challenged (as 
of this writing successfully) a rule shifting the ability to provide an expedited deadline from the federal 
courts to the Attorney General.  See Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. C 13-4517 
CW, 2014 WL 3908220 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2014). 
 191. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). 
 192. I ascribe these purposes to AEDPA cavalierly, acknowledging that doing so has been 
thoroughly questioned by Professor Kovarsky.  See generally Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks, supra note 
25. 
 193. 551 U.S. 930, 938–42 (2007). 
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petitioner’s claim, the Court held that the state court failed to provide 
procedures adequate to ensure that an execution could be carried out 
consistently with Ford v. Wainwright, which held that the Eighth 
Amendment bars the execution of the insane.
194
  The Court stated: 
The state court’s failure to provide the procedures mandated by 
Ford constituted an unreasonable application of clearly 
established law as determined by this Court.  It is uncontested 
that petitioner made a substantial showing of incompetency. 
This showing entitled him to, among other things, an adequate 
means by which to submit expert psychiatric evidence in 
response to the evidence that had been solicited by the state 
court.  And it is clear from the record that the state court reached 
its competency determination after failing to provide petitioner 
with this process, notwithstanding counsel’s sustained effort, 
diligence, and compliance with court orders.  As a result of this 
error, our review of petitioner’s underlying incompetency claim 
is unencumbered by the deference AEDPA normally requires.
195
 
Consequently, the Court concluded that the state court’s process 
itself abrogated the deferential structure of AEDPA, and it proceeded 
to analyze petitioner’s mental illness claim de novo.
196
  An 
examination of state process is thus fully consistent with existing 
habeas jurisprudence. 
C. Coherence with Other Areas of Law 
Finally, a focus on state adjudicative process in federal habeas is 
consistent with the reasonableness analysis that courts undertake in 
other areas of law.  I do not think there is anything inherently 
controversial about looking to other areas of law for the meaning of 
ambiguous terms, but if the project needs further support, habeas 
doctrine provides it: Williams’ citation to the “common,” “familiar” 
nature of the objective reasonableness standard suggests that it is 
entirely appropriate to look to other areas of law for the meaning of the 
standard in the habeas context.   
In tort law, fact-finders look at how a particular decision was reached, 
whether reasonable precautions were taken, or whether any risks of error 
 
 194. Id. at 948 (internal citation omitted). 
 195. Id.  
 196. The Court also noted that the fact that the Ford standard was stated in general terms did not 
make its application reasonable, since AEDPA “recognizes . . . that even a general standard may be 
applied in an unreasonable manner.”  Id. at 953. 
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were unreasonable.197  Jurists and scholars have long debated how to 
undertake this analysis,198 the most famous suggestion being the Hand 
Formula199, but the reasonableness of a particular act or decision is not 
usually analyzed in a factual vacuum.  To the contrary, the process of 
arriving at that act or decision provides the context in which the 
objective reasonableness of the actor’s behavior can be assessed.  
Another example (frequently seen in habeas cases) is the law 
governing ineffective assistance of counsel.  Since there are myriad 
ways to try a case, the Supreme Court has declined to create any 
substantive checklist for what constitutes effective representation.200  
Instead, as in the torts context, the Court has repeatedly looked to what 
counsel actually did to determine whether a reasonable attorney in 
counsel’s position would have done the same—whether counsel 
terminated an investigation at a reasonable point,201 failed to examine 
evidence that was available and likely to be used in the prosecution’s 
case,202 or failed to request funds to which the defendant was entitled in 
order to hire an expert.203  These are all examples of looking at the steps 
an actor took (and did not take) to determine the reasonableness of his or 
her decisions; a procedural solution to a substantive quandary.  
Perhaps the most informative area of law that employs an objective 
reasonableness test is the law of constitutional torts.  This is because, 
first, constitutional tort law has also historically used a standard of 
objective reasonableness that refers to the range of judgment that 
would govern the decisions of a reasonably competent decision-
maker; and, second, its structure—involving reasonable or 
 
 197. See EPSTEIN, supra note 57, § 5.16 (“The fundamental postulate of the law of negligence is 
that [a defendant] is responsible only for the unreasonable risks created by his conduct.”); Kenneth W. 
Simons, The Puzzling Doctrine of Contributory Negligence, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1693, 1695 (1995) 
(discussing requirement that people take reasonable precautions to prevent accidents, even when they 
are not proximate cause).  The reasonable precaution/risk of error balancing test bears similarities with 
the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test for due process. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 198. See, e.g., Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323 
(2012); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Traditional Versus Economic Analysis: Evidence from Cardozo and 
Posner Torts Opinions, 62 FLA. L. REV. 667, 668 (2010); Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining 
Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 813 (2001); Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. 
L. REV. 311 (1996); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Tragedy in Torts, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 139 
(1996); Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 
677 (1985); see generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007); GUIDO 
CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970). 
 199. U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.).   
 200. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (“More specific guidelines are not appropriate. 
The Sixth Amendment refers simply to ‘counsel,’ not specifying particular requirements of effective 
assistance.”). 
 201. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 525 (2003). 
 202. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 384 (2005). 
 203. Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1088 (2014). 
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unreasonable applications of clearly established law—parallels 
AEDPA’s.  I do not mean to suggest that the law of constitutional torts 
should be imported into habeas doctrine wholesale or that these two 
doctrines are equivalent.  Habeas and constitutional tort law serve 
significantly different purposes.  Also, efforts to interpret AEDPA 
standard by reference to constitutional tort law have been met with 
skepticism from courts.204  Nor do I mean to hold up constitutional tort 
law as ideal—civil rights scholars would likely shudder at the 
suggestion that the Supreme Court’s doctrine in this area is a model of 
clarity or fairness.205  But even if not exemplary, constitutional tort law 
can be informative for our purposes, so I will briefly describe its focus 
on process for assessing reasonableness. 
D. Process as Reasonableness: Constitutional Torts 
The Civil Rights Act of 1861, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, permits 
civil actions for deprivation of rights by officials acting “under color of” 
law.  The Supreme Court has long recognized a qualified immunity 
defense for those officials who violate rights, but act in good faith.206  
The purpose of qualified immunity is to balance the vindication and 
protection of citizens’ constitutional rights on the one hand, with the 
need to have law enforcement officials perform their duties without 
excessive fear of personal liability on the other.207  While the good faith 
test for qualified immunity initially employed by the Court contained 
both subjective and objective elements, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,208 the 
Court limited the availability of qualified immunity to an objective 
 
 204. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380 n.12 (Op. of Stevens, J.) (rejecting notion that 
Court should treat “clearly established law” as meaning the same thing under AEDPA and constitutional 
tort law, since the two areas are “doctrinally district”).  See also Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 
1152 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting comparison between reasonableness in habeas and qualified immunity 
law as a “faux analogue[]” because, unlike a court’s review of government officers’ actions under 
§ 1983, “our review of state court decisions under AEDPA is not constrained because the state courts’ 
functions are somehow more discretionary than ours, or because they must be more vigorous in the 
discharge of their duties”); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting different 
purposes).  
 205. For a small sampling of the vast literature criticizing qualified immunity doctrine, see Karen 
Blum, Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope 
Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. REV. 633 (2013); Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. 
REV. 117 (2009); Mark R. Brown, The Fall and Rise of Qualified Immunity: From Hope to Harris, 9 
NEV. L.J. 185 (2008); Diana Hassel, Living A Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 MO. L. REV. 123 
(1999); Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in 
Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1997); Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User’s 
Manual, 26 IND. L. REV. 187 (1993). 
 206. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 
247-48 (1974). 
 207. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167–68 (1992). 
 208. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
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inquiry: “[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”209  Harlow and 
subsequent cases210 established a two part test for analyzing qualified 
immunity: (1) was a constitutional right violated? and (2) was the right 
clearly established such that a reasonable officer would know he was 
violating it?   
The Harlow test has remained the standard for qualified immunity 
since that decision.  However, in some cases, the Court has put a 
“reasonably competent officer” gloss on the standard, akin to the 
fairminded jurists test.  In Malley v. Briggs,211 for example, the Court 
faced a claim for qualified immunity where a police officer had 
presented arrest warrants to a magistrate, had the warrants signed, and 
then relied on the warrants in conducting an arrest.212  The warrants 
were found to be unsupported by probable cause.  Nevertheless, the 
officer claimed entitlement to absolute immunity or, in the alternative, to 
qualified immunity on the basis that seeking a warrant from a neutral 
magistrate was per se objectively reasonable.213  The Court rejected the 
notion that absolute immunity was required to protect officers stating, 
“As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample 
protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate the law.”214  The Court then articulated what the qualified 
immunity standard was that would be applied in that case: “Defendants 
will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no 
reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant 
should issue; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on 
this issue, immunity should be recognized.”215  The Court elaborated on 
 
 209. Id. at 818 (emphasis added). 
 210. E.g. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 194 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
 211. 475 U.S. 335 (1986). 
 212. Id. at 338. 
 213. Id. at 339, 345. 
 214. Id. at 341. 
 215. Id. (emphasis added).  The Court confusingly did not stick to its modified standard even 
within the Malley decision: when it actually applied the qualified immunity test, it reverted back to the 
familiar Harlow standard.  The Court first rejected the officer’s argument that seeking the warrants was 
per se objectively reasonable.  Then the Court stated the qualified immunity question to be “whether a 
reasonably well-trained officer in petitioner’s position would have known that his affidavit failed to 
establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant.”  Id. at 345 (footnote 
omitted).  More confusing still, the actual question of whether the officer in Malley was entitled to 
qualified immunity under the Harlow standard was not before the Court, and it declined to answer it.  
See id. at 345 n.8 (“The question is not presented to us, nor do we decide, whether petitioner's conduct 
in this case was in fact objectively reasonable. That issue must be resolved on remand.”).   
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why it was applying a seemingly more deferential, “reasonably 
competent officer” standard, based on the respective roles of the police 
officer and magistrate who approved the warrant: 
[I]t goes without saying that where a magistrate acts mistakenly in 
issuing a warrant but within the range of professional competence 
of a magistrate, the officer who requested the warrant cannot be 
held liable. But it is different if no officer of reasonable 
competence would have requested the warrant, i.e., his request is 
outside the range of the professional competence expected of an 
officer. If the magistrate issues the warrant in such a case, his 
action is not just a reasonable mistake, but an unacceptable error 
indicating gross incompetence or neglect of duty. The officer then 
cannot excuse his own default by pointing to the greater 
incompetence of the magistrate.216 
Because the magistrate has greater expertise in law, an officer might 
be excused for relying on the magistrate’s mistake—unless the error was 
so obvious that no reasonably competent officer would think there was 
probable cause to support the warrant application. 
That was a theme picked up on by Justice Powell in his partial 
concurrence/partial dissent.  Justice Powell noted that the majority’s 
opinion did not foreclose some consideration of the fact that a neutral 
magistrate had approved the warrant, despite the “little evidentiary 
weight” the Court seemed to afford it.217  He was concerned that the 
majority opinion “denigrate[d] the relevance of the judge’s 
determination of probable cause and his role in the issuance of the 
warrant” and in so doing, misconstrued the respective roles of the police 
officer and the magistrate or judicial officer.218  Justice Powell cited 
longstanding precedent recognizing the “division of functions” between 
police and magistrate, and argued that the police should be encouraged 
to submit affidavits to judicial officers.219  Therefore, he would have 
held that where an officer goes through “the essential checkpoint 
between the Government and the citizen,”220 and applies to a neutral 
magistrate for a warrant, that fact should be given substantial 
evidentiary weight. 
Although Justice Powell’s opinion did not carry the day, it has fared 
better with time.  In recent years, the Court has given substantial weight 
to officers’ passing through “the essential checkpoint” of a neutral 
 
 216. Id. at 346 n.9. 
 217. Id. at 350–51 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 218. Id. at 351. 
 219. Id. at 352–53. 
 220. Id. at 352 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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magistrate.  In Messerschmidt v. Millender,221 a 2012 case involving a 
warrant that was approved but turned out to be overbroad, the defendant 
officers’ process in applying for the warrant and the division of 
functions between themselves and other actors played significant roles 
in the Court’s finding their conduct reasonable.  The Court cited the fact 
that the officers had obtained approval of superiors, an assistant district 
attorney, and the neutral magistrate in obtaining the warrant.  Therefore, 
the Court held (quoting Malley), it could not be said that “no officer of 
reasonable competence would have requested the warrant,” because that 
would mean not only that the defendant officers were plainly 
incompetent, “but that their supervisor, the deputy district attorney, and 
the magistrate were as well.”222  Instead, by going through the process of 
applying for and obtaining the warrant, the officers “took every 
reasonable step that could be expected of them.”223  As a result, the 
Court concluded that the defendant officers’ actions were not “entirely 
unreasonable”224 (the qualifier suggesting a higher threshold for 
overcoming qualified immunity than run-of-the-mill objective 
unreasonableness).   
These cases show that, within its objective reasonableness analysis, 
the Court has been willing to apply a more exacting “reasonably 
competent officer” test in cases where defendant officers go through the 
steps of obtaining a warrant from a neutral magistrate—even where the 
warrant turns out to be defective.  Central to these cases is the officers’ 
process and the division of functions between the executive official and 
the neutral judicial actor.   
A few theories might support the application of a higher standard in 
these cases.  First, taking these steps protects citizens’ constitutional 
rights ex ante, so the balance that qualified immunity seeks to strike is 
already weighted in favor of constitutional protection (hence the 
rebuttable presumption that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant 
 
 221. 132 S. Ct. 1235 (2012). 
 222. Id. at 1249–50 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 223. Id. at 1249.  This holding was roundly criticized by both the partial concurrence (Justice 
Kagan) and dissent (Justice Sotomayor) as inconsistent with Malley’s requirement that the officers not 
simply rely on the approval of the magistrate, but instead exercise their own independent judgment 
about the lawfulness of the warrant. Id. at 1252 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. 
at 1259–60 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  The majority dismissed this criticism, saying, “by holding in 
Malley that a magistrate's approval does not automatically render an officer’s conduct reasonable, we 
did not suggest that approval by a magistrate or review by others is irrelevant to the objective 
reasonableness of the officers’ determination that the warrant was valid.”  Id. at 1249-50.  This reading 
of Malley channels Justice Powell’s point in his partial concurrence that the Court did not exclude the 
fact that the officer sought a warrant from consideration. 
 224. Id. at 1246, 1249 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This standard, taken 
from the exclusionary rule context, see U.S. v. Leon, 460 U.S. 897, 923 (1984), was, before 
Messerschmidt, entirely unprecedented in Supreme Court § 1983 caselaw. 
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complies with the Fourth Amendment).  Second, applying greater 
deference to practices that are not constitutionally required in all cases, 
yet are preferred, incentivizes those practices.  Third, a heightened 
standard of review in such cases does not upset the balance qualified 
immunity is intended to achieve because the Court has created a 
backstop for especially egregious or obvious errors.225 
I do not want to oversell the utility of the Supreme Court’s qualified 
immunity jurisprudence for our purposes.  The Court itself has not 
always been explicit or consistent about when it is applying a 
“reasonably competent officer” standard.226  Further, its use of this 
language has caused significant confusion in the lower courts, leading 
several circuits to adopt a version of this standard, dubbed “arguable 
probable cause,” not just in cases where officers take extra precautions, 
but across the board.227  Several circuit judges have criticized the 
standard, including then-judge Sonia Sotomayor, who described it as 
giving government defendants a “second bite at the immunity apple” 
and for taking “courts outside their traditional domain, asking them to 
speculate as to the range of views that reasonable law enforcement 
officers might hold, rather than engaging them in the objective 
reasonableness determination that courts are well-equipped to make.”228  
 
 225. In Groh v. Ramirez, the defendant officers obtained a search warrant, but the places to be 
searched and the items to be seized were conspicuously absent from the warrant.  540 U.S. 551, 554 
(2004).  The Supreme Court held that such a warrant was plainly invalid.  It rejected the defendant 
agent’s argument that, despite its invalidity, the search was nevertheless reasonable because the 
magistrate had authorized the search on the basis of adequate probable cause contained in the 
application.   The Court held that “the warrant was so obviously deficient that we must regard the search 
as ‘warrantless’ within the meaning of our case law.”  Id. at 558.   The Court went on to deny qualified 
immunity because “even a cursory reading of the warrant in this case—perhaps just a simple glance—
would have revealed a glaring deficiency that any reasonable police officer would have known was 
constitutionally fatal.”  Id. at 564.  Thus, the Court has set a limit on what should be considered 
“reasonable competence” in the qualified immunity context. 
 226. In fact, no Supreme Court majority opinion has repeated Malley’s specific invocation of 
reasonable disagreement. 
 227. See Tal J. Lifshitz, Note, “Arguable Probable Cause”: An Unwarranted Approach to 
Qualified Immunity, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1159, 1178 (2011) (citing cases from the First, Second, Fifth, 
Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits employing an “arguable probable cause” standard).  Other 
scholars have noted that the Eleventh Circuit has been especially aggressive in applying the “arguable 
probable cause” standard to render officials immune from suit, calling it “the circuit of ‘unqualified 
immunity.’”  Brown, supra note 205, at 207 n.196 (quoting Elizabeth J. Norman et al., Statutory Civil 
Rights, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1499, 1556 (2002)).  
 228. Walcyzk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); accord 
McColley v. Cnty of Rensselaer, 740 F.3d 817, 830–31 (2d Cir. 2014) (Calabresi, J., concurring) 
(criticizing arguable probable cause standard for creating “a nimbus of protection around probable 
cause, which allows officers to make objectively unreasonable probable cause determinations so long as 
the officer themselves are reasonably competent”); see also Taravella v. Town of Wolcott, 599 F.3d 
129, 136–37 (2d Cir 2010) (Straub J., dissenting) (noting confusion about which standards is proper).  
One district judge has also criticized the use of this standard in qualified immunity cases.  Peterson v. 
Bernardi, 719 F. Supp. 2d 419, 429 n.9 (D.N.J. 2010) (“‘Arguable probable cause’ is a confusing 
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In making this argument, then-judge Sotomayor noted that the Supreme 
Court had “specifically criticized the conflation of an objective 
reasonableness standard with a requirement of unanimous consensus” in 
Williams.229 
Moreover, like in the habeas context, the Supreme Court has often 
elided the reasonableness prong of the qualified immunity inquiry with 
the “clearly established law” prong.  In several cases in which the Court 
has found that the law was not clearly established, it has articulated the 
reasonableness standard with the “all but the plainly incompetent” 
officer formulation.230  The Court has similarly spoken of “general” and 
“specific” legal rules in the constitutional tort context that might impact 
the range of reasonable responses by defendant officers.231  In both 
areas, it seems, the Court may squeeze the deference balloon on either 
the application prong or the clearly established law prong, and achieve 
the same result while muddying the standard.  In the constitutional torts 
context, however, there is at least one rationale for applying greater 
deference when the correct application to the law is not obvious that 
does not exist in habeas, namely, we do not expect police officers to 
have the same expertise with applying the law that judges do.232  
These reservations aside, the constitutional tort cases that apply a 
 
construct, because it suggests that qualified immunity is available whenever fairminded officers may 
disagree on the presence of probable cause.”).  The issue of whether arguable probable cause comported 
with the Supreme Court’s caselaw was squarely raised in a cert petition in the October 2013 term.  Pet. 
for Writ of Cert., Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861 (2014) (No. 13-551) 2013 WL 5864010 (U.S.).  The 
Court ultimately reversed a finding of qualified immunity, but did not address the lower court’s analysis 
of reasonableness.  Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 n.3 (2014) (per curiam). 
 229. Walcyzk, 496 F.3d at 170 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).   
 230. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 
(1987); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (“A Government official’s conduct 
violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, [t]he contours of [a] right 
[are] sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing 
violates that right.” (emphasis added) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
accord id. (“[E]xisting precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 
debate.”).  Judge Reinhardt has criticized the Court’s recent jurisprudence, especially al-Kidd as erecting 
insurmountable barriers for plaintiffs in the constitutional torts context similar to the barriers it has 
erected for petitioners in the habeas context.  See Reinhardt, Demise of Habeas, supra note 7, at 1244-
50. 
 231. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (holding that “general statements of the law 
are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning,” in “obvious” cases).  Professor Stephen 
Vladeck has written thoughtfully about the parallel between the application prong and the clearly 
established law prong in habeas and constitutional tort law, and the “order of battle” in which courts 
address the two elements.  See Vladeck, supra note 12. 
 232. Because the qualification in AEDPA that clearly established law can only come from the 
Supreme Court, however, police officers are ironically required to apply a great deal more law than state 
courts in habeas cases, including circuit court decisions and even legal rules that have developed 
through the consensus of district courts.  See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) (noting clearly 
established law in qualified immunity context can derive from “cases of controlling authority in the 
[officers’] jurisdiction” or a “consensus of cases of persuasive authority”).  
47
Biale: Beyond a Reasonable Disagreement:  Judging Habeas Corpus
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2015
1384 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83 
reasonably competent officer standard suggest a framework where a 
heightened reasonableness standard might be appropriate: where the 
officers’ process and the division of functions between them and other 
institutional actors, specifically a neutral magistrate, protect 
constitutional rights ex ante.  Our next and final task is to apply that 
framework to habeas corpus law. 
V. APPLICATION: A PROCESS-BASED FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING 
STATE COURT DECISIONS IN FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS 
Habeas law stands to benefit tremendously from a process-based 
framework, in terms of both administrative ease and fairness (without 
sacrificing comity).  The ongoing problem of systemic violations of 
state criminal defendants’ constitutional rights has been well 
documented.233  I will not attempt an exhaustive review of these 
deficiencies, nor will I attempt to prove their pervasiveness.  Neither is 
necessary in the framework this Article proposes.  Instead, in a process-
based habeas framework, the federal court can presume that the state is 
co-equally committed to protecting constitutional rights, and may 
consider its process for doing so in assessing whether the state’s 
adjudication of the case is ultimately reasonable.  I am not suggesting 
that federal courts maintain a checklist of mandatory procedures, or that 
the existence of any single procedure might outweigh the absence of 
others.  For example, as previously mentioned, AEDPA already 
provides expedited timelines where states can establish that they furnish 
capital defendants with adequate post-conviction counsel.234  But the 
benefits of counsel would diminish drastically if counsel has insufficient 
time or resources to investigate the case.235  How federal courts should 
weigh these different procedures against one another in their holistic 
assessment of the state process is a subject that warrants greater 
attention, but it suffices now to put forward the following aspects of 
state process as candidates for consideration:  
A. The Provision of Post-conviction Counsel 
At first glance, there would seem to be no analogue in habeas law to a 
 
 233. See, e.g., Primus, Structural Habeas, supra note 15, at 16–23; see generally Stephen B. 
Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE 
L.J. 2150, 2171 (2013).. 
 234. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 235. See Sean D. O'Brien, When Life Depends on It: Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation 
Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 759 (2008) 
(“Representing a capital client is a labor-intensive, time-consuming undertaking; there are no 
shortcuts.”). 
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police officer’s application for a warrant to a neutral magistrate and the 
benefits that “division of functions” creates.  There is, however, an 
additional player in the habeas context who serves a different but 
perhaps comparable role in the adjudication of a prisoner’s 
constitutional claims: post-conviction counsel.  Counsel is guaranteed to 
a defendant at trial and during the direct appeal,236 but not in post-
conviction proceedings.  Many states provide post-conviction counsel in 
capital cases, though some states leave this decision up to the discretion 
of the trial court. 237  Scholars and advocates have long argued that the 
complex procedural rules in state courts that determine what issues are 
reviewable on federal habeas should require the states to provide an 
attorney to indigent prisoners during post-conviction proceedings.
238
  
While the Supreme Court has yet to recognize any such right to post-
conviction counsel emanating from the Constitution, it has recently 
acknowledged that for some claims, such as ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel, “a prisoner likely needs an attorney.”239   
Let’s assume, however, that the Supreme Court will remain reluctant 
to mandate the provision of counsel, or, may mandate it only in capital 
cases.  Federal courts could still incentivize state courts to appoint 
counsel by considering whether counsel has been provided in its 
reasonableness review.  Like the addition of the magistrate’s 
independent judgment in the warrant context, post-conviction counsel 
can assist the state court in fleshing out the constitutional issues through 
investigation of the prisoner’s claims, adding specificity to the post-
conviction petition, and litigating issues in the trial and appellate courts.  
A decision arrived at with the benefit of the assistance of counsel 
therefore could be considered more reliable by the federal habeas 
court.240   
 
 236. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985). 
 237. Alabama, for example, leaves the appointment of counsel up to the state post-conviction trial 
court.  Ala. Code § 15-12-23(a) (2014).  See also Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective 
Assistance of Capital Postconviction Counsel: Constitutional Implications of Statutory Grants of 
Capital Counsel, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 31, 63–66 (2003) (reviewing states at time of publication that 
provided postconviction counsel in capital cases). 
 238. See, e.g., Shay, supra note 187, at 488; Eric M. Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines in 
Capital State Post-Conviction Proceedings After Martinez and Pinholster, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101 
(2013); Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral 
Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 339, 353–56 (2006); see generally Am. Bar 
Ass’n, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1, 79–92 (1990); see also Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the 
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1866 (1994) (noting ability to present 
postconviction claims depended on “sheer luck” of having pro bono counsel take on capital cases).   
 239. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012).  See also Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 
(2012). 
 240. Adequate counsel might also reduce the caseload in federal courts by persuading the state 
court to grant habeas relief. 
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To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that my proposal mandates the 
appointment of counsel if states wish to have their decisions upheld on 
federal habeas review.  Any such mandate, while perhaps advisable, 
would likely need to derive from the Constitution.  Nor would the 
provision of an attorney render the result of state court proceedings per 
se objectively reasonable.
241
  Including the appointment of counsel as a 
“reasonable step” a state court could take to obtain more deference from 
the federal court instead charts a middle path: still limiting federal 
review only to objectively unreasonable state court decisions, but 
considering the division of functions between defense counsel and judge 
as relevant to whether the adjudication is reasonable. 
B. Access to an Evidentiary Hearing 
Similar to the provision of counsel, state courts are often derelict in 
providing evidentiary hearings to develop the factual basis for 
postconviction petitioners’ claims.242  Such hearings have taken on 
greater significance in the federal habeas context recently, however, 
because of a decision of the Supreme Court issued the same day as 
Richter.  In Cullen v. Pinholster,243 the Court held that any facts that the 
federal court considers in the § 2254(d) analysis must first be presented 
to the state court.244  In other words, a federal court could not hold an 
evidentiary hearing and then grant habeas relief based on new facts 
adduced at that hearing—the facts are, in effect, frozen by the time the 
case reaches federal court.  Accordingly, state post-conviction 
proceedings are the last opportunity for habeas petitioners to develop 
their claims.  As Professor Kovarsky puts it, “the state habeas 
proceeding is now the ball game.”245   
Of course, whether to hold a hearing can be a complex question of 
state law that requires an assessment of whether the state post-
conviction petition presents disputed issues of material fact.246  
Importantly, under Pinholster, the federal court cannot consider what 
evidence the petitioner would have put forward in the non-existent 
hearing to determine whether the state court’s denial of a hearing was 
 
 241. Failure to provide adequate funding for counsel to present a case, for example, would render 
the assistance of counsel illusory.  See generally Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
 242. See Freedman, supra note 238, at 597.  Longstanding Supreme Court precedent arguably 
requires state courts to hold evidentiary hearings in order to give petitioners an opportunity to develop 
such facts.  See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 129 (1964); McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 
(1961).   
 243. 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011). 
 244. Id. at 1398. 
 245. Kovarsky, supra note 187. 
 246. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32.9(a) (2014); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (2014). 
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unreasonable.  Nevertheless, the decision whether to hold a hearing can 
be relevant to the federal court’s determination that the adjudication 
involved a reasonable application of the law to the facts, since the state 
court will have gone through the process of determining what the facts 
are.
247
  Indeed, it makes good sense to defer to the state court’s decision 
when, for example, it has conducted a fact-finding that includes 
credibility determinations.248  Holding a hearing is plainly one of the 
“reasonable steps” a state court can take in adjudicating a claim, and 
therefore should be relevant to the objective reasonableness of its 
decision. 
C. Robust Review 
Another important “division of functions” in the state courts is the 
structure of its review of post-conviction claims.  While all states have a 
vertical appellate structure, it does not always mean robust review of a 
petitioner’s claims at each level.  In Alabama, for example, the trial 
judge often simply signs the prosecutor’s proposed order denying post-
conviction relief, a practice disapproved by the appellate courts but not 
heavily policed.249  An intermediate Court of Criminal Appeals then 
reviews post-conviction appeals from the trial courts, but the Alabama 
Supreme Court provides only discretionary review of a limited subset of 
cases.250  While its review is somewhat more expansive in death penalty 
cases,251 in practice it grants certiorari in very few, making fulsome 
review in only one court the norm.  In Oklahoma, a unitary appeal 
structure requires defendants to challenge the effectiveness of their trial 
attorneys on direct appeal.252  This presents two problems for petitioners 
alleging this claim: they have little time or opportunity to conduct an 
adequate investigation of their attorney’s deficiencies and, because 
Oklahoma does not require new counsel on appeal, many defense 
attorneys are left, as Professor Primus has noted, “in the untenable 
position of having to raise their own ineffectiveness on appeal.”253  In 
 
 247. Failure to hold an evidentiary hearing or permit some other opportunity for a petitioner to 
develop evidence may also be said to result in an unreasonable determination of the facts under 
§ 2254(d)(2),  see Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 765, 790-91 (9th Cir. 2014), or may indicate an “absence of 
available State corrective process,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i). 
 248. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). 
 249. See, e.g., Ex parte Jenkins, 105 So. 3d 1250, 1258–59 (Ala. 2012) (Petitioner failed to show 
that trial  court's order denying petition for postconviction relief was not product of trial court’s 
independent judgment, and thus petitioner was not entitled to reversal of order within hours of receiving 
it). 
 250. ALA. R. APP. P. 39(a)(1) (2014). 
 251. ALA. R. APP. P. 39(a)(2). 
 252. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, ch. 18, APP. R. 3.11(B)(3)(b) (2003). 
 253. Primus, Structural Habeas, supra note 15, at 19. 
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California, funding for state habeas counsel is conditioned on filing 
habeas petitions directly in the California Supreme Court, which can 
summarily deny relief without a hearing and with no further appellate 
review of the prisoner’s post-conviction claims.254  Federal courts can 
rightly look to the division of functions between the state trial courts and 
appellate courts in determining whether the adjudication of the 
petitioner’s constitutional claims was reasonable.   
D. Reasoned Statements 
Finally, the reasoning of a state court decision is part of the process 
the court goes through in adjudicating the claims, and therefore is a 
proper subject for scrutiny by the federal court.  This suggestion of 
course runs into the major holding of Richter, which applies AEDPA 
deference to summary denials.255  Even before Richter, some federal 
courts were resistant to analyzing the reasoning of state court decisions, 
with some derisively referring to this type of review as “grading 
papers”256 (though even these courts acknowledged that “sound 
reasoning will enhance the likelihood that a state court’s ruling will be 
determined to be a ‘reasonable application’ of Supreme Court law”257).  
As described above, federal courts have split post-Richter on whether 
they must concoct their own plausible reasons for a state court’s 
decision when the state court does provide its own reasoning.258   
The process-based framework to objective reasonableness charts a 
middle path between ignoring the state court’s reasoning on the one 
hand, and the insufficiently deferential “grading papers” approach on the 
other.  Whether or not the state court states its reasons, the federal court 
still must uphold its decision if it is objectively reasonable, as Richter 
hammers home.  But the state court’s reasoning should be seen as a step 
in that court’s process of adjudicating the federal claim, relevant to the 
objective reasonableness analysis.  It is a step that federal courts may 
incentivize, if not mandate, consistently with AEDPA’s structure and 
purpose.  Indeed, where a state court provides sound reasoning for its 
decision, it respects the state courts to rely on such reasoning rather than 
to “impute a view to [the state] courts that they have never in fact 
 
 254. See SUPREME COURT POLICIES REGARDING CASES ARISING FROM JUDGMENT OF DEATH, 
Policy 3, 2-1, at 5-6 (2012), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/PoliciesMar2012.pdf. 
 255. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99-100 (2011). 
 256. See, e.g., Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[W]e are determining the 
reasonableness of the state courts' ‘decision,’ not grading their papers.” (internal citation omitted); see 
also Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks, supra note 25, at 494–47 (discussing pre-Richter cases forswearing 
scrutiny of state court’s reasoning). 
 257. Cruz, 255 F.3d at 86. 
 258. See supra notes 155–58 and accompanying discussion. 
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espoused,” as Judge Calabresi has put it.259  The explication of the state 
court’s reasoning could prompt the federal court to apply a more 
deferential standard of review in assessing objective reasonableness, 
even while disagreeing with the ultimate result. 
These are just a few aspects of state adjudicative process that a 
federal court could examine to determine whether the results of that 
process are reasonable.  Courts could look to other factors as well.  
The adequacy of funding of defense counsel at trial unquestionably 
affects outcomes.  It also may be worth considering whether the 
state’s process for appointing or electing judges promotes judicial 
independence,
260
 though these broader proposals cannot be fully 
explored here. 
E. Coda: Richter Under the Process-Based Framework 
This Article has attempted to articulate a framework for judging the 
reasonableness of state court decisions in habeas cases that takes into 
account the state’s adjudicative process.  It may seem somewhat pie-in-
the-sky to suggest that federal courts adopt this framework given the 
Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence.  Indeed, Richter itself stands as 
a stark counterexample to the framework advocated here.  Richter filed 
his state post-conviction petition directly in the California Supreme 
Court.261  Because the state supreme court issued a summary denial, no 
evidentiary hearing was ever held so that Richter could develop his 
claim.262  All the state court did was to issue its one-sentence summary 
denial, and there was no further review.   
Under the process-based framework, this decision should not have 
been held to be reasonable based solely on the possibility of fairminded 
disagreement.  Admittedly, the Supreme Court found “ample basis” for 
 
 259. Hawthorne v. Schneiderman, 695 F.3d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 2012) (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
 260. Cf. James Sample, Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth: Judicial Campaign 
Spending and Equality, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 727 (2011) (arguing that guarantee of due 
process in state courts creates a compelling government interest in regulating spending in judicial 
elections); Derek Willis, ‘Soft on Crime’ TV Ads Affect Judges’ Decisions, Not Just Elections, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/upshot/soft-on-crime-tv-ads-affect-judges-
decisions-not-just-elections.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=1; see also OATH, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nDxs_Qt4Gyg (last visited Aug. 14, 2014) (TV ad supporting 
retention of three justices of Tennessee Supreme Court, stating that they faithfully followed their oath to 
uphold state constitution because they affirmed “nearly 90% of death sentences”); see also Fletcher, 
supra note 38, at 820-21 (describing 1986 election for California Supreme Court, in which challengers 
ran on platform of increasing use of death penalty, and noting that before election, 40% of cases were 
reversed due to constitutional error, while after election, 3.8% were reversed). 
 261. In re Joshua Richter on Habeas Corpus, 2001 Cal. LEXIS 1946 (Cal. Mar. 28 2001).   
 262. See Seligman, Harrington’s Wake, supra note 46, at 487. 
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the state court’s decision in Richter,263 suggesting that it was not a close 
case in which the existence of fairminded disagreement would be a 
necessary tie-breaker in favor of the respondent.  In such a case, it is 
likely that the state court decision would not rise to the level of objective 
unreasonableness under Williams, making any alterations to AEDPA 
standard in Richter dicta.  Still, under the process-based framework, 
Richter should not have applied a heightened standard. 
Despite the inappropriateness of applying a fairminded disagreement 
standard in a case like Richter, however, the standard has now been 
repeated in numerous Supreme Court opinions and is, for better or 
worse, part of habeas doctrine.  Therefore, we must reconcile it with the 
fact that the Court has never indicated a desire to overturn Williams or 
otherwise supplant objective reasonableness as the touchstone for all 
habeas cases.  This Article proposes reconciliation under a framework 
that takes state adjudicative process into account. In the absence of such 
a framework, we will continue to see confusion around the fairminded 
disagreement standard in the federal courts, and habeas corpus relief 
will become increasingly difficult to obtain, including in cases where 
justice demands it. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Like other creatures that rise from the dead, the return of the 
fairminded disagreement standard to habeas law is an unwelcome 
development.  This Article has attempted to clear up the confusion 
occasioned by its revivification.  The new standard cannot mean that 
subjectivism has returned to habeas review.  Nor can fairminded 
disagreement on its own suffice to deny habeas relief.  Instead, courts 
should adopt a framework for analyzing reasonableness that takes into 
account the state courts’ adjudicative process.  This framework is 
consistent with the “common,” “familiar” understanding of 
reasonableness from other areas of law.  It also provides flexibility and 
calibrates the level of federal deference to the steps the state court takes.  
The process-based framework leaves room for the states to develop their 
own procedures, thereby advancing the federalism and comity principles 
underlying AEDPA, while not abdicating the federal courts’ obligation 
to protect against “extreme malfunctions” in individual cases.264  And it 
incentivizes state courts to “conduct their proceedings in a manner 
consistent with established constitutional standards,”265 thereby 
enhancing the role of both state and federal courts as guardians of 
 
 263. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). 
 264. Id. at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 265. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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constitutional rights.  Such a framework is especially needed now, as 
some states have begun to consider measures that would speed up their 
capital appeals, and thereby reduce state process in cases where the 
petitioner faces the death penalty.266  If federal courts must simply 
ignore these reductions in due process in cases where it is most needed 
because fairminded jurists could disagree about the results, then the 
“double security” provided by the Great Writ has diminished indeed.267 
Critics of AEDPA may object to any attempt to build a model for 
federal review that includes a standard that, in their view, is overly 
deferential to state courts, overly hostile to claims of prisoners, and 
ultimately unjust.268  Other commentators may object on the ground that 
the standard for federal habeas relief should be essentially 
insurmountable.269  On these political questions, reasonable people can 
surely disagree.  But habeas doctrine now includes two standards that, as 
I have shown, are in troubling tension with one another.  This Article 
has tried to break through that tension and propose a way forward.  By 
looking to other areas of law that employ standards of objective 
reasonableness, courts can take process into account in habeas law and 
get back to the familiar business of deciding what’s reasonable, rather 
than who’s reasonable.  
 
 266. In the 2013-2014 legislative term, Alabama and Kansas considered bills that would have 
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